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I. A REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF INFOEMA.TION 
A. Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
In a great many decision problems, the consequences which will result 
from actions taken are not perfectly known. The final consequence, or 
outcome, of an action will depend upon the occurrence of and interaction 
between literally thousands of relevant events which are not under the 
decision maker's control. In this chapter we shall review the theory of 
the value of information, which requires us to look upon the actual 
realization of these events as a random variable. 
Fundamental contributions to this theory were made by Von Neumann 
and Morgeastern [79], Wald [81], Blackwell and Girshick [12], Marschak 
[48], Savage [68], and Raiffa and Schlaifer [64]. The expositions by 
Marschak most clearly considered the determinants of the value of informa­
tion. Therefore, the exposition of the theory in this dissertation will 
follow Marschak's notation as closely as possible. 
Throughout this chapter, as the concepts are developed, we shall 
illustrate the methodology by solving a simplified version of the decision 
problem faced by the farmer at least once a year: what crops should I 
plant, and how should I grow them? The relevant outcome here is profit: 
price times quantity less costs. But at the time the decision to plant 
is made, the farmer does not know the prices at which he can sell the 
crops in the fall, the quantities which will be harvested, or the costs 
of production. These depend upon events occurring over the growing 
season, most not under his control, which will affect the market supply 
and demand for his products, his individual production, and his costs. 
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In general, how can decision makers take actions in the face of 
uncertainty which are optimal in some sense? We shall solve this problem 
in six steps: 1) description of the basic actions which could be taken 
and states of the world which might obtain, 2) assessment of the outcome 
from each action-state pair, 3) reduction of the descriptions into the 
relevant ones, 4) choice of criterion, 5) assessment of the probability 
distribution, and 6) choice of the best action to take, including the 
option of purchasing further information. 
The first step in solving a decision problem is to divide the 
components of the problem into two sets; 1) those variables which are 
not under the control of the decision maker, usually termed states of 
the world, and 2) those variables which are under control, usually 
termed actions. 
Suppose that the set of basic states of the world is finite, and 
can be expressed as the set 
X = {x^, X2, ... x^} = {%}. 
Each X e X is a complete description of a state of the world which 
may occur. For example, in the farmer's crop decision problem, a portion 
of a typical element of X is x^ = {1^ inches of rain on July 12, 350 
million tons of wheat harvested in Russia, 3 hailstorms in August, 
average price of August com $2.25, average price of August com 
predicted in June $2.50, GNP = 2 trillion dollars, ...}. 
Each X £ X has aptly been called by Marschak a "future history," 
in that when, with the passage of time, the future possibilities become 
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the actual realization, that realization will be duly recorded as 
history. 
Likewise, let the set of basic acts be finite and expressed as the 
set 
A = {a^, a^, ... a^} = {a}. 
Each a^ is a complete description of an action wfeich might be taken. 
However, at this point we explicitly assume that the option to purchase 
further information is not included in any element of A. After we 
discuss the nature of information in section B, we shall add in the option 
of purchasing further information. A comparison of the results with 
and without the information will result in the fundamental equation. (1.25) 
for the value of information. 
In our example, a typical element of A is a^ = {plant 80 acres 
com, plant 60 acres sorghian, cultivate on June 10 and July 1, take a 
vacation August 3-10, ...}. 
The second step in the decision process is the assessment of either 
the benefit or the loss resulting from each action in every future 
history. Throughout this dissertation, we will assume this outcome is 
numerical (e.g. profit in dollars). This assessment defines a function 
with domain X x A and range the set of outcomes 0 = {}. That is, to 
each pair (x,a) there corresponds one element in 0. We shall 
consistently use the notation 
°xa = 
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where the subscripts on the functional fora indicate the domaia of the 
function, and the items in parentheses are the specific arguments. 
Furthermore, to each outcome, the decision maker is assumed to 
assign a real number. 
"xa ° =*' (1.2) 
called the utility of the outcome from taking act a e A when in fact 
state X £ X obtains. Following Friedman and Savage [25], if the utility 
function UQ[ . ] is linear in the argument, we shall say the decision 
maker exhibits neutrality towards risk. If UQ[ , ] is a concave function, 
we shall say the decision maker is a risk averter, and if u^f . ] is 
convex, the decision maker is a risk lover. 
The utility assignment can conveniently be represented as the 
pxn gain matrix U: 
U = {u } = 
xa 
*1^1 
u 
"1% 
u 
=2*1 
u 
^2^2 
u 
"2% 
u 
Vi 
u 
*n*2 
u 
X a 
n p 
(1.3) 
Needless to say, if most decision problems were solved in their 
full technicality, the matrix U would be of extremely large dimension. 
Often it is necessary to reduce the complexity of decision problems in 
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order to be able to focus on the nub of the problem. The question of 
the necessary detail is a very important one, one which must be solved 
prior to the solution of the problem of the optimal act. Too much 
detail can result in extra costs due to excess computation and other 
complexity costs (Faden and Rausser [19]). Too little detail can make 
it difficult to make choices. 
Marschak [46] presented the following approach to the problem of 
finding the optimal level of detail. 
Detail can be eliminated by partitioning the sets X and A into 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets, and calling each subset 
the new state or act description. 
By a partition of a set S, we shall mean a collection of events 
S ' = {ST", S£, ... s/} such that; 
a) s£ f <p; 
b) E S'; 
c) s^ n Sj = and 
k 
d) u sT = S. 
1=1 ^ 
For instance, the state description = {rainfall on July 12 of between 
1 and 3 inches, Russian grain production of between 200 and 400 million 
tons, less than 5 hailstorms, price of August com $2.25, ..,} is an 
element of a partition of the basic states X which contain x. on page 2 
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as a subset. The new state description has considerably less 
detail. 
The fundamental notion in Marschak's approach is the concept of 
the fineness of partitions of sets: 
DEFINITION 1. Let S' and be partitions of S. S' is said to be 
finer than S" (or S'" is said to be coarser than S') if for every s^ 
in 5% there is a s"' in with s"" cs"". 
In other words, the description s" contains at least the elements 
of s ' and possibly more. Each s" e S" has less detail. 
Two arbitrary partitions of any set S are not necessarily comparable 
with respect to fineness. Consider the following two partitions of 
the real line R: 
1) R' = {-«» < r < -6, -6 £ r £ 6, 6 < r < »} = {r£, r^, rg} 
2) R" = {-«= < r < 0, 0 £ r < co} = {r£% r^'} 
R' and R" are not comparable with respect to fineness because there is 
no r" E R'"' such that r^ ç r^'. Thus the relation "is finer than" 
induces a partial, not complete, ordering of the partitions of S. 
The question of the comparability of partitions with respect to 
fineness will become important when we discuss the comparability of 
information systems in section E of this chapter. 
We shall denote by Z = {z} a partition of X, the states of the world, 
and by C = {c} a partition of A. 
7 
We shall denote h^r Z = {Z} the set of all partitions of the set of 
states X, and by C = {C} the set of all partitions of A. The sets Z and C 
are lattices, each possessing a unique finest element {(%)} and {(a)}, 
and a unique coarsest element {(X)} and {(A)}, respectively. 
As we alter the descriptions of X and A by partitioning, we are 
altering the domain of the outcome function 0. Therefore, define a 
set of utility functions W; 
W = {[w^^(z,c) for all z e Z, c e C] 
for all Z e Z and C e C}. (1.4) 
That is, for every partition Z e Z and C e C, ( . ) is a function 
Wgg(z,c) = u^[0^^(z,c)] for all 
z e Z and c e C. (1.5) 
The set W is called the utility condition if it possesses the 
following three properties: 
1) each element of W is a utility function with domain ZxC to the 
set of all subsets of the real line, that is 
Wgg (z,c) = u^lo^^izyc)] c R for all z e Z, c e C, 
Z e Z, and C £ C; (1.6) 
2) for the case Z = X and C = A, that is, the original partitions, 
w^^(z,c) UQ[Oj^(x,a)]; and (1.7) 
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3) All the utility functions in W are consistent in the sense that 
Wgg(z,c) = U U UQIo (x,a)] 
xez aec 
for all z e Z, c e C, (1.8) 
In other words, the utility function after partitioning must be the union 
of the basic utility functions from each component of the partition. 
The following common sense definitions provide the desired guide 
for finding the optimal amount of detail, that is, the optimal ZxC. For 
a philosophical discussion of definitions like the following, see 
Tondl [78]. 
DEFINITION 2. ZxC is sufficiently fine, given W, if and only if, 
for all z e Z and c e C, the utility function 
w -(z,c) = U U u_[o„.(x,a)] (1.9) 
XEZ aec 
is a single element set. 
In other words, the partition ZxC is sufficiently fine, if and only 
if, for every element z e Z and c e C, the payoff from each elementary 
element in zxc is identical. Nothing is lost if these elements are 
combined, 
DEFINITION 3. The partition ZxC is sufficiently coarse, given w, 
if and only if, for every z^, Z2 e Z and c^, Cg e C: 
a) W2g(z^,c) = for all c e C 
implies z^ = z^, and (1.10a) 
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b) w^^(z,c^) = w^gCzjCp for all z e Z 
implies = c^. (1.10b) 
Condition (a) says that for each act description c, the partition 
ZxC is sufficiently coarse, given W, if and only if the utility function 
assigns the same utility to two state descriptions, then the two state 
descriptions are identical. In other words, if the two state descrip­
tions amount to six of one, half a dozen of the other, there is no reason 
to distinguish between them. 
Condition (b) says that for each state description z, the partition 
ZxC is sufficiently coarse, given W, if and only If the utility function 
assigns the same utility to two act descriptions, then the two act 
descriptions are identical. If there is more than one way to skin a cat, 
then there is no reason to distinguish between the methods. 
DEFINITION 4. The partitioning ZxC is called payoff relevant, 
given W, if and only if ZxC is simultaneously sufficiently fine and 
sufficiently coarse. 
In [46], Marschak proves that given the utility condition W, 
there is one and only one payoff relevant description of states and 
acts. It is this description with which choice of an optimal act 
description is made. 
The fourth step in the decision process is the choice of a criterion 
with which to decide. There are many such criteria; two of special 
importance are 1) the minimax criterion and 2) the expected utility 
criterion. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
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The minimax criterion tells the decision maker to pick the act 
which minimizes the maximum loss possible (or maximizes the 
gain). As such it does not require a probability distribution over the 
states, and is most useful in situations where nature is against you 
(e.g. an opponent). Thus, it is very important in game theory. On the 
other hand, when nature is not agaiast you, minimax can lead to very 
pessimistic decisions. 
The expected utility criterion tells the decision maker to pick 
the act which maximizes the mathematical expectation of utility. This 
is the criterion which will be used throughout this dissertation. 
This assumption can be justified by presenting some postulates of 
rational behavior under uncertainty and then proving that acceptance 
of the postulates implies acceptance of the expected utility hypothesis 
(Savage [68], Von Neumann and Morgenstem [79]), but this approach will 
not be given here. 
Use of the expected utility criterion requires a fifth input into 
i:he analysis: a probability measure P defined upon the set of basic 
states of the world 11, This probability measure has subjective aspects, 
and must be made in a rational, pragmatic way, i.e., the measure should 
be free of both wishful thinking and paranoia. This input is crucial 
to the analysis. Writing P(X = x) = p(x), for P to be a probability 
measure, it must be true that 0 _< p(x) ^  1 and I p(x) = 1. For now, 
X 
we shall assume p(x) is known. The determination of p(x) will be 
considered further when we discuss the supply of information, section F 
of this chapter. 
11 
The probability measure P induces a number of important probability 
density functions: for now we only mention one, the marginal distribu­
tion of the payoff relevant description of states. Write P(Xez) = p(z), 
then p(z) = p(x). 
By the definition of mathematical e^ectation, the expected utility 
of each act description c e C is 
E^IWzcCzjC)] = Z w^iz^c) p(z), (1.11) 
z 
where the subscript under the E operator denotes the distribution with 
which expectation is to be performed. 
Under this criterion, the decision maker should choose the act 
description c* defined as that c \^ich maximizes expected utility: 
max E [w (z,c)] = max Z w (z,c)p(z) = E [w (z,c*)]. (1.12) 
ceC ^ CGC z ^ 
Our development has necessarily been long, so we now illustrate 
these ideas with the following example. 
A farmer must decide which crop to plant. He has two choices : 
1) he can plant com, which will flourish if the weather is wet, and do 
poorly if the weather is dry, or 2) he can plant sorghum, which will be 
less profitable Lhan com in a wet year but more profitable in a dry 
year. He begins his analysis of the problem by identifying the following 
two basic acts; 
a^ = plant com; 
a^ = plant sorghum. 
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He also identifies the following four basic states of the world: 
*1 
the weather was dry and the Information source predicted dry; 
^2 = the weather was dry and the information source predicted wet; 
X3 = the weather was wet and the information source predicted wet; 
^4 = the weather was wet and the information source predicted dry. 
He then computes the basic payoffs as follows: 
*1 =2 =3 *4 
"$100 $100 $300 $300" 
200 200 250 250 
The numbers represent the net profit per acre. 
Furthermore, he assigns a probability distribution over X such that 
p(x^) + pCx^) + p(x^) + p(x^> = 1. 
His first problem is to find the payoff relevant description of 
states and acts. The basic utility matrix is obviously always suffi­
ciently fine, however, it is currently not sufficiently coarse. This 
is because although 
w^(x^,a) = w^Cx^ja) and 
for all a e A, it is not true that x^ = x^ or x^ = x^. The reason for 
this is because what the information source predicts has no bearing 
upon what nature actually does, and that is what the final payoff depends 
13 
upon. The decision maker must find another partition of the states of 
the world. 
It might be instructive to consider the partition Z* = {(z^), (Zg)} 
{(x^, x^, Xg), (x^)}. The utility function for this partition, using 
(1.8), is: 
(100,300) 300 
_(200,250) 250_ 
Although this partitioning is now sufficiently coarse, it is no longer 
sufficiently fine, e.g. the outcome of act a^ when state z^ obtains is 
no longer single valued. 
Clearly, the payoff relevant description of states and acts is 
given by Z = f(z^), (z^,)} = {(x^, x^), (x^, x^)} and C = {(c^), (c^)} = 
{(a^), 
This description has utility function 
^1 ^2 
~100 300~ 
_20Q 250_ 
and is both sufficiently fine and sufficiently coarse. Furthermore, 
p(z^) = p(x^) + p(x,) and p(z2) = p^xy) + p(x^). For specificity, let 
p(z^) = p(z2) = h-
In the ^zonomics of uncertainty, in order to make the best decision, 
the farmer must now compute the expected payoff from each action. This 
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is easy and we find, using (1.11), that 
E^[Wzc(z,Ci)] = (100)% + (300)% = $200, and 
E^[Wzc(Z,C2)] = (200)% + (250)% = $225. 
Thus, the optimal decision is Cg, and the expected utility from the best 
decision is 
max E [w (z,c)] = $225. 
ceC ^ 
However, the decision maker in the problem above, or, more generally, 
the one using equation (1.11^, quite possibly is not maximizing his 
expected utility from the problem as a whole! The decision maker can 
control the act, he knows his tastes and can assess the consequences 
of each act in each Su<-,te, but he cannot control the state. Can he 
control the probability distribution of the payoff relevant states? The 
answer, perhaps surprisingly, is yes. The decision maker can make use 
of the information source and base his action upon the state of the 
world which the information source identifies. Why might the information 
source be valuable, in the sense of increasing the expected utility of 
the decision maker? 
In the economics of uncertainty, all the current knowledge that 
the decision maker has is embodied in the prior probability distribution 
of the payoff relevant states, p(z). But there may be information 
sources which might eliminate the possibility of some states, decrease 
the probability of others, and increase the probability of still others. 
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With this nerf probability distribution, say p'(z), called the posterior 
distribution, it may be that a different act will be undertaken, one 
that could result in a different expected payoff. We hypothesize, and 
will prove later, that by making use of an information source, which 
will be subsequently defined, the expected payoff in a decision problem 
under uncertainty is at least as great as the expected payoff from not 
using the information source. That is, information sources have value. 
They also of course have cost, and the problem of finding the optimal 
information source is the problem of maximizing the excess of 
expected payoff over expected cost. 
As was pointed out by Hirshleifer [32], we can view the economics of 
information as an active approach to decision making, and the economics 
of uncertainty as a passive approach. In fact, the economics of uncer­
tainty is a special case. A problem in the economics of uncertainty 
is one in which the information source provides the message "no further 
information." A typical problem in information economics consists of 
choosing both an information source which produces messages, and a 
decision rule which tells the optimal action to take for every possible 
message which could be received. 
Before formalizing these notions, it is necessary to consider 
more closely the nature of information and its value. 
B. Information 
One of the ways Webster defines information is, "knowledge communi­
cated by others or obtained from investigation, study, or instruction." 
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Another definition is "any message which changes the perceived probability 
distribution of the states of the world." 
The distinction between knowledge and information can be explained 
by drawing an analogy with capital theory. Capital is a stock; at any 
point in time it is all produced means of production. Knowledge can 
also be conceived of as a stock; at any point in time it is the stock of 
what is known. The current state of knowledge is embodied in the current 
probability distribution of the states of the world. Things known with 
certainty have probability one. 
Investment is a flow: as it occurs it changes the stock of capital. 
Information is also a flow: it alters the stock of what is known. It 
alters the probability distribution of the states of the world. 
Furthermore, analogous to the depreciation of capital is the 
forgetting of knowledge. 
All information must take the form of a message, or stimulus, but 
not all messages are information. 
A necessary condition for a message to be information is that it 
be news, i.e. something not already known. When the content of the 
message is already known, the impact of the message will already have 
been incorporated in the probability estimates, the message is not 
information, and has no value. 
Another necessary condition for a message to be information is 
that it be comprehensible. If a message is so technical or poorly 
expressed that the decision maker cannot assess the impact of the message 
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upon the probability distribution of states, the message is not infor­
mation. 
A message can be information, but still have no value. A message 
stating your aunt's birthday is information to me; it alters my 
probability distribution over that event, but it has no value to me; 
it is not payoff-relevant to any of my decisions. It may be payoff-
relevant to you. This illustrates the fact that there can be no single 
measure of the value of information %hich is independent of the tastes 
and preferences of the decision maker. Specifically, any measure of the 
economic value of information which is based solely upon changes in the 
probability distribution of states cannot be optimal. The role of one 
of these measures, the entropy function, is discussed later. 
Some literature [8] has attempted to identify an "improvement in 
information" with a mean preserving reduction in the variance of the 
probability distribution over the states. By our definition of infor­
mation, there is no necessary relationship between the informativeness 
of messages and the effect upon the variance which the message has. 
In decision making, messages can come in ^ ich greatly cloud the issue; 
the messages are still information, and can have value to the extent 
they cause more conservative actions to be taken. 
How can we measure the value of information, in the sense of the 
maximum amount the decision maker should pay in order to receive the 
information? 
By the very nature of information, the economic value of a message 
is an ex-post quantity. It is only after the message has been received. 
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the impact analyzed, the appropriate action taken and the true state of 
the world obtained that one can put a value on the message. Suppose 
the message causes the decision maker to change his action from the 
prior optimal act c^ to the posterior optimal act c^. Suppose the actual 
realized state cf the world is z.. The ex-post value of the message, 
VOM, in dollars is the solution to the equation 
The quantity VOM may he positive or negative. The message may result 
in the act c being more in line with the true state z, than was c , 
t J s 
but the message could in a sense steer the decision maker wrong and 
make him take an act c^ which is less favorable than c^, given the true 
state Zj. 
Although there may be situations in which it is desirable to 
maximize this ex-post quantity, this characterization is not useful for 
the decision maker trying to decide how much, ex-ante, to pay for the 
message. This is because he does not know beforehand what the message 
will be. If he did, the message would not be information, it would 
already be known. 
What the decision maker must do is enumerate all the possible 
messages which could be received from the Information source. These 
form the set of potential messages Y = {y^, yg, ... y^}. Next, he 
must decide what action will be taken in the event message y^ is received, 
that is, decide upon a set of decision rules c^ = aCy^), j = 1 ... m. 
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Finally, he must compute the expected payoff from using the information 
source and the optimal decision rules. Roughly speaking, the expected 
value of the information source is the dollar figure which results in 
the expected utility of the net outcome from optimally using the informa­
tion source being equal to the expected utility from making the optimal 
decision without the information source. It is the demand price of 
information. Later, we shall show it is nonnegative. 
There are two important restions: 1) how does the decision maker 
determine the set of potential messages Y and 2) how doss the decision 
maker determine the probability distribution of each message y., which 
is necessary in order to compute the expected utility from the information 
source? 
The answers to these questions are already embodied in the definition 
of the problem. 
We view the set of states of the world X to be defined richly 
enough to include the message received as one of the attributes of each 
state. This is precisely what we did in the example of the farmer's 
crop decision problem. From now on, we define the information structure 
resulting from an information source as being another partition of the 
set of states of the world X into m mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
subsets. The particular message received will identify one of the 
subsets. 
Thus, from the standpoint of demand, we view information not as a 
single message but rather as the set of potential state descriptions 
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Y = {y^, ... y^} associated with a given source. There are many such 
partitions, and the problem of choice of the optimal information struc­
ture is a central problem in the economics of information. 
Returning for a moment to our example, one natural information 
structure is 
Y = ty^, y2} ^ *4)» *3)) 
= {(the weather was wet or the weather was dzry, the informa­
tion source predicted dry), (the weather was wet or the 
weather was dry, the information source predicted wet)}. 
It is easy to see that, in this scheme, there is no need for a 
separate concept of faulty information; this possibility is already 
reflected in the set X. 
In addition, the probability measure P over X induces the desired 
marginal distribution of Y. It is easy to see in the example that 
pCyP = P(xp + and pCyg) = p(x2) + pfxg). 
But more: the probability measure P induces the joint distribution 
p(z,y) over payoff relevant events and messages, and from this we can 
derive both 1) the posterior distribution of z given y, p(zjy), and 
2) the likelihood function that message y will be received, given state 
z is true, p(y|z). 
In the next section, we shall make these concepts more precise. 
C. The Value of Information 
Equation (1.12) says that the maximum expected utility from a 
decision problem if there is no further information is the following 
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chain of notational definitions 
max E [w (z,c)] = max Z w„_(z,c)p(z) = E Iw- (z,c*)]. (1.12) 
ceC ^ CGC z ^ 
On the other hand, let us suppose we make the decision to utilize 
an information structure before we choose c. Our goal Is to determine 
the expected value of utility if optimal use is made of the information 
structure. 
As was discussed by Wald [81], the introduction of the possibility 
of using new information does not alter the basic features of a decision 
problem. 
The first step the decision maker must take is to determine the 
optimal decision rules. These rules determine in advance the action 
which will be taken in response to each possible future information 
signal. A decision rule a is a function from the set Y of possible 
messages to the set C of payoff relevant actions. Thus 
c = a(y) c e C, y e Y (1.14) 
is a decision rule. In principle, the set of alternative decision rules 
is the set of all functions from Y to C. 
The decision rule induces, for each y, a probability distribution over 
c, denoted p(c|y). If this distribution has all of its mass at one point, 
the decision rule is said to be deterministic. If not, the decision rule 
is termed randomized. With no costs of decision making, in a problem like 
this, any expected payoff available with a randomized strategy is also 
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available with a deterministic strategy. This essential completenass 
of the class of deterministic rules was proven by Dvoretsky, Wald, and 
Wolfowitz [18]. 
For computational simplicity, nonlinear decision rules are often 
linearized [Theil (75)]. 
The outcome function becomes 
cx(y)) (1.15) 
and the utility function is 
= W2^(z»a(y)) = xiQ(.0^^(zya(y)')) (1.16) 
The expectation of the utility function is 
E w (z,c) = Z Z w (z,a(y)) p(z,y). (1.17) 
yeY zeZ 
We desire to maximize (1.17) by choosing the optimal decision rule 
a*(y). 
Before proceeding, we note that: 
a) p(z) = p(Xez) = Z p(x) is the marginal on z; 
b) p(y) = p(Xey) = Z p(x) is the marginal on y; 
xey 
c) p(z,y) = p(Xez, Xey) = Z p(x) is the joint distribution of 
xezny 
z and y; 
d) p(z|y) = > p(y) ^  0 is the posterior distribution of z 
given y; and 
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e) p(ylz) = ^ > P(z) ^  0 is the likelihood of message y, 
given 2 .  
Expected utility can be rewritten 
E_ w (z,c) = Z Z w (z,a(y))p(z|y)p(y) 
ycY zeZ 
= 2 p(y) E w (z.a(y))n(zly) = E E : w ( 2,ci(y)) (1.18) 
yeY zeZ ^ 
We note that, in the third expression, only the rightmost sum 
depends upon the choice o(y). Thus we find that to maximize (1.18) over 
the set of decision rules we can maximize separately the expected payoffs 
conditional upon each message y. If a* is an optimal decision rule, then 
E„| w (z,o*(y)) = max Z w (z,a(y))p(z|y) (1.19) 
a zeZ 
Finally, we expect over y and we get the expected utility from 
best use of the information structure 
E w (z,a*(y)) = Z p(y) max Z w ( 2,a(y))p(z|y) 
Y yeY o ZEZ 
= E^max Eg|yWg^(z,u(y)) (1.20) 
More simply, if we admit only deterministic decision rules, we 
can denote c^ = a*(y) as the optimal act, given y, and can write the 
expected value of maximum utility from using the source as 
^z.y"zc'^'V ° ^ (1-2" 
y 
In the sequel, this quantity will be denoted U(P ,w), to illustrate 
the dependence of the gross expected utility on the information structure Y 
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and the payoff function w. To repeat: in order to find the expected 
utility frcn the best use of an information structure, we first condition 
the problem on each possible information signal, determine the condi­
tionally optimal acts to take, and tisa. expect over the probability 
distribution of the signals. 
We define the expected value of an information structure, EVIS, as 
the dollar amount which makes the expected utility with the information 
structure equal to the expected utility without the information struc­
ture. That is, if the quantity EVIS is paid for the information 
structure, the net outcome function will be 
o^c^ZjC) = 02q(z»c) - EVIS for all zeZ, ceC. (1.22) 
The utility of this outcome is 
v^^(zyc) = Uq[O2J,(Z,C)] . (1.23) 
The maximum net utility from using Y is 
:y G2|y;^c(z,a(y)) 
= Ey max E2|yUQ[02g(z,o(y)) - EVIS] 
= E max E I u^[0 (z,c) - EVIS]. (1.24) 
y ceC 
To ease the notational burden, the domain indices will now be 
dropped. 
By appropriate choice of measurement scales, we can assume the cost 
of no information is zero, and so the maximum net expected utility with 
25 
no information is 
max E u[o( 2,c)]. (1.12) 
CEC ^ 
We define the expected value of the information structure as the 
value of EVIS which makes (1.24) equal to (1.12). EVIS is the solution 
to the equation 
E max E^j u[o(z,c) - EVIS] = max E^u[o(z,c)]. (1.25) 
^ ceC ceC ^ 
We shall now prove that EVIS is a nonnegative number, that is, 
that information received and disposed of at no cost cannot hurt the 
decision maker. 
Assume for now that EVIS =0. We shall show that 
E max El u[o(z,c)] ^  max E^u[o(z,c)], (1.26) 
^ ceC ceC ^ 
Since the utility function for income is assumed to be nondecreasing, 
proof of (1.26) will imply that there exists a number EVIS ^ 0, such 
that when it is subtracted from each outcome o(z,c), strict equality in 
(1.26) holds. For proof of this existence, see Marschak and Radner [50]. 
We have defined the act c^ as the act such that, given y, 
Ez jyU[o (z,Cy) ] ^  EzjyUri7(z,c) ] for any ceC. (1.27) 
This statement is true for every ysY, and any ceC which is chosen. 
We now expect both sides of (1.27) with respect to the distribution 
of y. Multiplying both sides by p(y) (all nonnegative) and summing over 
y gives 
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Z E^jyU[o(2,Cy)]p(y) _> Z E^jyU[o(z,c)]p(y), 
or 
EyE^jyU[0(z.Cy)] ^  EyE^jyUEc?(z,c)]. (1.28) 
for any ccC. The left-hand side represents the gross expected utility 
from making optimal use of the information structure by taking the act 
Cy appropriate to the information signal. The right-hand side is the 
expected gross utility from any other constant action. 
In particular, the case of no information results in & constant 
action. This is because the information structure is the degenerate one 
Y » {(y^)} - {(X)} 
offering one message: "(me element of the set % will occur." Thus 
pCyj) " 1. 
The right-hand side of (1.28) then can be rewritten 
EyE^jyU(o(z,c)] for any ceC 
» Z Zu[o(z,c)]p(z}y)p(y) 
y z 
» Eu[c(z,c)]p(z) 
z 
• E^u[o(z,c)] fcr any ceC. (1.29) 
Thus we know, combining (1.28) and (1.29), that 
E E I ulo(z,c„) 1 ^ B_uIo <t,c) ] (1.30) 
y *17 J " 
for any ceC. 
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Since this is true for any ceC, it is true for the ceC which 
maximizes the right-hand side. Thus 
E E I u[o(z,c )] ^  max E u[o(z,c)]. (1.31) 
^ - ceC " 
Finally, using the definition of c^., we get (1.26) which was to be 
proven : 
E max E I u[n(z,c)] ^  maxE u[o(z,c)], (1.26) 
^ ceC ceC ^ 
In other words, the expected value of the maxima cannot be less 
than the maximum expected value. Information systems have value because 
by offering the decision maker a state description closer to reality, 
more appropriate acts can be taken. 
One might ask, "what if the information system always steers us 
wrong? Won't that result in less utility than if we had not used the 
system?" The answer is no; the decision maker is simply not using the 
optimal decision rules. A critic we never agree with can still be a 
valuable information source: just believe the opposite of what he 
recommends ! 
Most discussions and applications of the theory of the value of 
information assume risk neutrality on the part of the decision maker. 
This is mainly due to computational difficulties. Accordingly, unless 
otherwise noted, throughout this dissertation we shall assume neutrality 
towards risk. In this special case, the definition of EVIS reduces 
to 
28 
EVIS = E y g|yW(z,c) - max E^w(z,c) max E 
ceC ceC 
= u(P ,w) - E^w(z,c*). (1.32) 
We shall now use these concepts to investigate the determinants of 
the value of the natural information structure Y = {7^,72} = {(x^,x^), 
(xgsXg)} in the example of this chapter. See page 11 for the formulation 
of the problem. 
We have already shown that 
max E w(z,c) = E w(z,c_) = $225. 
csC . = ^ ^ 
Our goal is to determine EVIS as a function of pCxg) and p(x^), 
the joint probabilities that the information source will steer us wrong, 
given p(z), the prior distribution of the payoff relevant states. 
The first step is the discovery of the decision rules. In 
accordance with (1.19), we need the posterior distribution p(zjy). 
This calculation can conveniently be put in the matrix : 
n = 
p(zilyi) p(z2lyi) 
p(Zlly2) 
p(x^) + p(x^) p(x^) + p(x^) 
p(x2) + p(x2) p(x2) + p(x2) 
The matrix II, whose rows sum to 1, is a Markov matrix representing 
the probability of state obtaining, given message y^ was received. 
In this 2x2 example, if the elements on the main diagonal of n are 1, 
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we have the case of perfect information. If these elements are 0 we 
also have perfect information (the source is incorrect 100 percent of 
the time), Otherwise, information is said to be imperfect. 
For the decision rule 0(7^) = c^, we get conditional expected 
utility of 
Ej,|y^w(z,Ci) = 100 + 200 p^Zgly^). 
Likewise, for the decision rule o(y^) = Cg, we get 
^z|y^*(^'C2) ^  200 + 50 p(z2|y^). 
Thus, the optimal decision rule is 
c. if p(z |y ) >_ 2/3; 
«*(yJ = ^ 
Cg if p(z2|y^) < 2/3, 
In other words, when the prediction is dry, the optimal thing to do is 
plant sorghum, if the posterior probability of an error is less than 
2/3. 
A similar calculation will show 
if p(z,|y») < 1/3; 
a*(y_) = 
Cg if P(=ily2) - 1/3' 
Thus 
max El w(z,c) = 100 + 200 p(z»|y^) if p(z„jy ) ^ 2/3, 
ceC ^'^1 ^ 
= 200 + 50 pCz^jyj^) If p^Zgjy^) <_ 2/3, 
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and 
max E I w(z,c) = 300 - 200 p(z_|y_) if p(z,|y_) £ 1/3, 
ceC ^ 
= 250 - 50 pCz^lyg) if pCz^jyg) >_ 1/3. 
To compute the expected value of rnavimim, utility vhen best use is 
made of the information structure, we now must expect the above functions 
with respect to the marginal distribution of the y^. 
There are four cases which must be considered: 
Case I P(z2lyi^ — 2/3 and 
Case II p(z2|yj^) <. 2/3 and p(z^ly2) >_ 1/3; 
Case III p(z2|yj^) >. 2/3 and p(z^iy2) _> 1/3; 
Case IV p(z2lyj^) 2L 2/3 and p(z, jy^) £ 1/3. 
Recall that we have already assumed that pCs^) + pCsg) ~ + 
p(x^) = 1/2. This obviously Implies the constraints pCxj) £ 1/2 and 
p(x^) < 1/2. 
In Case I, 
P(x^) P(x^) 
^ ^ 2'?! " p(x^) + p(x^) ~ h - pCx^) + P(x^) -
and 
P(x2) pCx^) 
PC^iIYZ) - p(%2) + pCXg) ~ p(x2) + % - P(x^) — 
We assume that each message has positive probability, thus the 
31 
denominators of both fractions are strictly positive. Rearrangement 
of the above conditions result in 
1 1 - 2 pCx^), p(x^) £ % - 2 pCxg), 1 h and 
p(x^) 1 h. 
On figure 1.1, this region is denoted by the Roman numeral I. 
Similar calculations show that the locus of combinations of pCxg) 
and p(x^) which fall into Case II obeys the conditions 
p(x^) <1-2 pCx^), p(x^) >h - 2 pCxg), 
pCxg) £ y, and p(x^) _< 
This region is marked by the Roman numeral II and is surrounded by 
heavy black lines. 
Case III loci obey the relations 
p( x ^ )  > 1 - 2  pCx g ) ,  p ( x ^ )  > h  -  2  pC x g )  
pCxg) £ hf and p(x^) £ h-
On the exhibit this region, marked III, is the upper right 
bordered triangle. 
Case IV is impossible in this problem. 
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(0,%) 
(0,0) (%,0) (%,0) pCxg) 
Figure 1.1. Iso-EVIS curves as a function of 
the prior probability of errors 
pCxg) and p(x^). 
We now compute 
1 max E |_w(z,c) = p(yi)E , w(z,c ) 
y ceC ziYi Yi 
+ P(y2)Gz|yJ*(='=7.) 
for each case. 
In Case I, we have 
50 p(x^) 
[p(x^) + PCxj)] [200 + + p(x^)l 
200 p(x_) 
+ [pCxp + pCxj)] [300 - + p(%2)] 
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which., after substituting out for p(x^) and p(xg) and rearranging, is 
250 - 100 pCx^) - 50 p(x^). 
EVIS in this case is 
EVIS = 250 - 100 pCxg) - 50 p(x^) - 225 
= 25 - 100 p (x^) - 50 p (x^). 
EVIS is at a maximum for perfect information, pCxg) = p(x^) = 0. Here 
EVIS equals $25. As the chance for error rises, EVIS falls. Within 
the range of Case I, iso-EVIS curves can be found by taking the total 
differential d EVIS = -100 d pCx^) - 50 d p(x^), setting d EVIS = 0, 
and seeing the iso-EVIS curves are linear with slope 
d p(x^) 
d pCx^) ~ 
These curves are pictured as the dotted lines in figure 1.1. The 
direction of increasing value is indicated by the arrows. 
Similar calculations will show that in Case II, EVIS =0. That 
is, if the accuracy of the structure [pCxg), p(x^)] is in the region 
delineated as Case II, nothing is expected to be gained from using the 
information source. If there is any cost to the information, the source 
should not be used. 
In Case III, the source is so inaccurate that we believe the 
opposite of what is predicted. EVIS is computed to be 
EVIS = -50 + 100 pCxg) + 50 p(x^). 
34 
The indifference curves are again linear with slope 
d p(x^) 
d pCxg) 
= -2. 
D. The Value of the Binary Information System 
We shall now investigate the general value of information relation­
ships for the case of two states, two acts, and two messages. This 
special case is termed the binary information system. 
Given a problem with gain matrix 
^1 ^2 
^2 ^1 ^2 
(1.33) 
it is clear that for an interesting problem either g^ > h^ and h^ > g^ 
or gg < h2 and h^ < g^. Otherwise, one action would be dominating or 
the decision maker would be indifferent between the actions. Let the 
states be renamed such that g^ > hg and h^ > g^. This loses no generality 
and is accomplished by permuting the columns of U. Furthermore, let the 
acts be renamed such that + hg > g^ + §2' ^h^s also loses no 
generality and is accomplished by permuting the rows of D. Thus for 
example in the interesting problem 
U = 
'2 L_-
^1 ^2 
~ 50 400~ 
100 300 
35 
the conventions are not met, but with the following renaming they are: 
C, 
^2 h 
~300 100 
400 50 
The consequence of these conventions is that the following 
inequalities hold; 
+ ^ 2 - + §2' 
I>1 - Si 1 $2 - h;. 
hj -
and, a fortiori. 
\ Bi ^ ^2 82' 
thus 
k = gg - - ^ 2 ^  0. (1.35) 
The quantity k is simply a constant which must be strictly greater 
than zero, y is a very important quantity. It measures, in a sense, 
the relative advantage in payoff of (the suitably defined) act C2 over c^. 
With no information, given only an assumed marginal distribution 
on z, say 
p(z^) = p*(z^) and pCz^) = 1 - p*(z^), (1.36) 
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the optimal action, to take is the one obeying (1,12); it will be c^ if 
E^w(2,C^) 2 E^W(Z,C2) 
and c^ otherwise. This implies 
g]^P*(zi) + g2[l-p*(z^)] 2 h^p*(z^) + h2[l-p*(z^)] 
which reduces to 
That is, if p*(z^) _< (g2-h2)/k, the optimal action is c,, and the maximum 
expected payoff with no information is 
If p*(z^) 2 (g2~^2^^^* the optimal action is C2 and the maximum expected 
payoff is 
The following diagram will prove useful: In (p(2^),p(z2)) space, 
3 given prior distribution can be represented on the unit square as a 
rectangle of dimension p*(z^) by 1 - p*(z^). 
p*(z^) < (g2-h2)/k. (1.37) 
EgWCZfC^) = g2 + (§3^-82) P* (2^)- (1.38) 
E^W(Z,C2) = h2 + (h^-h2)p*(z^). (1.39) 
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l-p*(z ) 
Figure 1.2. Representation of the prior distribution. 
The prior distribution 
P^Cz^) = (g2-h2)/k (1.40) 
is clearly the break even prior in which the optimal act and the formula 
for the expected payoff from the decision changes. 
Let y^ be identified with a message stating will obtain, and 
y2 be identified with the similar statement about 22» 
There are four possible decision rules, and the posterior expected 
payoffs conditional on each message are: 
1) for the rule a(y^) = c^. 
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= 2l + (22-ëi) P(z2lyi); (1.41) 
2) for the rule a(y^) = Cg, 
E 
z 
|^^w(z,c^) = + (hg-h^) pCzgly^); (1.42) 
3) for the rule cCyg) = c,, 
\[y^w(z,Cj^) = gg + (g^-ga) p(z^ly2); and (1.43) 
4) for the rule aCyg^ = Cg, 
= ^ 2 + (h^-h^) pCz^jyg)' (1.44) 
Therefore, the optimal (deterministic) décision rules are 
= c if p(zJy ) >_ (h.-g )/k 
= if p^Zgly^) 1 (h^-g^)/k 
and 
= c if p(z |y ) < (g -h_)/k 
a*(yj ^ ^ ^ 
= C2 if p(z^|y2) 1 (g2-h2)/k. 
There are four cases to be considered: 
Case I p(z2|yi) <_ (hj^-gj^)/k and p(z^|y2) j< iz2~^'2} 
Case II p(z2ly^) £ (hj^-g^/k and p(z^[y2) 2 (gg-b^)/^; 
Case III p(22|yj^) ^  (h^-g^)/k and pCz^jyg) ^  
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Case IV pCzgly^) _> (h^-gj^)/k and p(2^Iy2) _< 
These conditions will now be expressed in terms of the joint 
probabilities of messages and states, defined as before as the measure 
on the set X: 
P = 
p(x^) P(x^) 
p(x2) pCxg) 
The probability of each payoff relevant state is the sum of the 
probabilities of the two events comprising it, i.e., p*(z^) = p(x^) 
+ pCx^), and p*(z2) = pCXg) + p(xj = 1 - p*(z^). 
Substitution of the equivalent joint probabilities for the posterior 
probabilities, rearrangement, and recollection of the definition of y, 
equation (1.34), results in the following inequalities for each case: 
For case I: 
a) p(x^) < Y [p^Czj) - pCx^)]' 
b) p(x^) £ 1 - P*(z^) - Y P(%2)' 
c) p(x^) £ 1 - P*(z^), and 
d) pCxg) £ P*(z^). 
For case II: 
a) p(x^) £ Y [p*(z^) - pCxg)], 
b) p(x^) 1 1 - P*(z^) - Y PCXg)' 
c) p(x^) £ 1 - P*(z^), and 
d) pCxg) £ p*(z^). 
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For case III: 
a) p(x^) 2 Y [p*(z^) - pCxg)], 
b) p(x^) ^ 1 - P*(z^) - Y pCzg), 
c) p(x^) £ 1 - p*(z^), and 
d) pCxg) £ P*(Zi). 
For case IV: 
a) p(x^) > Y [p*(2j^) - pCxg)], 
b) p(x^) 1 1 - P*(Z]^) - Y pCxz), 
c) p(x^) 1 1 - P*(z^), and 
d) p(x2) < p*(Zj^). 
Inequalities (c) and (d) for each case follow obviously from the defini­
tion of p*(2^). 
Economically, cases I and III represent combinations of p*(z^), 
pCxg), and p(x^) in which either act is possible; in case II, only act 
C2 will be taken, and in case IV, only act c^ will be taken. 
In case I, the constraint (a) or (b) which is binding depends 
upon 
min [YP*(z^), 1 - p*(z^)]. 
The breakeven value at which the relevant constraint changes is 
YP*(z^) = 1 - p*(z^), or 
p*(z^) = 1/(1+Y). 
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Substituting the definition of y from (1 .34)  and rearranging implies 
this breakeven value is identical to the breakeven value defined by 
(1 .40):  
1/(1+y) = (22-^2)/% = p*(z^). 
That is, for p*(z^) _< p*^z^) the binding constraint in case I 
is (a), otherwise, it is (b). 
In case II, the constraints are inconsistent when 
min [yp*(2^), 1 - p*(z^)] = Yp*(z^), 
that is, this case is impossible if p*(z^) _< p*(Zj^) , In other words, 
if the prior optimal act is c^, there can be no combinations of p(x2) 
and p(x^) in which the optimal response to both messages is Cg. For 
the situation 
min [yP*(z^), 1 - P*(z^)] = 1 - p*(z^), 
the inequalities (a) and (b) define a region in which act c^ is optimal 
for both messages, and since p*(z^) 2 > this also is the case in 
which the prior optimal act is c^. It should not surprise the reader 
that this region is a locus of combinations in which EVIS = 0. 
In case III, whether (a) or (b) is binding turns on 
max [p*(z^), 1 - p*(z^)3. 
By an argument analogous to the one made for case I, when this maximum 
is Yp*(z^), it must also hold that p*(z^) ^  p*(z^), and when this 
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maximum is 1 - p*(z^), it must be true that p*(z^) _< p*(2^). 
Finally, case IV is impossible ^ en 
max [yp*(z^), 1 - p*(z^)] = yp*(z^), 
thus implying p*(z^) _> p*^z^). Again, when the prior optimal act is 
c^, there is no chance that the optimal response to both messages is 
act c^. When the maximum is 1 - p*(z^), case IV defines a region in 
which the optimal prior and posterior acts are c^. 
(1,1) 
(0,3/4) 
III 
III 
(%,0)(%,0) (3/4,0) pCzg) 
•Figure 1.3a. A case in which Figure 1.3b. A case in which 
p*(z^) < p*(z^). p*(z^) > p*(z^). 
The arguments of the previous five paragraphs are exemplified in 
figure 1.3. Each point inside the rectangle represents a pair of 
probabilities, (p(%2), p(%^)) of events which are "errors in informa­
tion." The particular numbers used are those of che example of this 
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chapter; in this case y = 2 and p*(z^) = 1/3. Note that the special 
case in which p*(z^) = p*(z^) has only regions I and III as possibilities. 
We shall now compute the gross utility of the information struc-
Y 
ture, u(P ,w) for each case. 
For case I, from (1.21), (1,42), (1,43), and the definition of 
conditional probability, 
u(P^,w) = E max E i w(z,c) 
' ceC 
" + P(?2) 
(h_-h_)p(x,) 
= IP(X^) + p(x^)] [h^ + 
(gi-g?)p(x?) 
+ [p(K^) + p(X3)] [gg + 
= §2 + [hi - g2]p*(Zi) + [gi - hj^]p(x2) + [h^ - (1.45) 
where the final equality follows from the facts that 
p(x^) = p*(z^) - p(x2) and pCx^) = 1 - p*(z^) - p(x^) 
For case II, similar calculation shows 
u(P^,w) = h^ + (h^ - h2)p*(z^). (1.46) 
For case III, we get 
U<P^,w) = h^ + [g^ - b^lpafz^) + [hj, - g^lpCxg) 
+ [g2 - hgjpCx^). (1.47) 
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Finally, when case TV holds, 
U(P^,w) »= 82 + (g^ - g2)p*(2j^). (1.48) 
We now can compute EVIS for each case. 
For case I, if p*(z^) _< p*(z^), the optimal prior act is c^ and 
EVIS is, from (1.32), (1.45), and (1.38) 
EVIS = U(P^ v) - E^w(2,CJ^) 
® 82 ^^1 ~ 82]p*(Zi) + tSi - h^]p(x2) + [1*2 - g2]p(x^) 
- [g2 + (g^ - g2)p*(Zi)3 
" - g^Jp^tâ^) + [g^ - h^jp(x2) + [hp - g2jp(*^)' (1.49a) 
If p*(z^) ^  the optimal prior act Is Cg and, using (1.39) instead 
of (1.38), 
EVIS = [gg - h2][l - p*(z^)] + [gj - h^jpCxg) 
+ [h^ - gg^Ptx^)' (1.49b) 
Case II is possible only if p*(z^) _> p*(z^). In this case, the 
prior optimal act is C2, the optimal response to both messages is C2, 
so, from (1.46) and (1.39) 
EVIS = hg + (.\ - h2)p*(zj) - ^ 2 - (h^ - h2)p*(2j) - 0. (1.50) 
Thus case 12 defines a useless region in which the information system 
has no va^ue. 
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In case III, if p*(z^) £ p*(z^), the optimal prior act is c^ and 
EVIS is, from (1.32), (1.47), and (1.38) 
EVIS = [hg - ggJfl - p*(z^)] + [h^ - gj^]p(x2) 
+ 1^2 " (1.51a) 
If p*(z^) _< p*(2^), the optimal prior act is c^ and using (1.39) instead 
of (1.38), 
EVIS = [g^ - h^]p*(z^) + [h^ - g^]p(x2) + [g2 - h^jpCx^). (1.51b) 
Finally, in case IV, it must hold that p*(z^) _< p*(z^) the prior 
optimal act is c^ and EVIS, from (1.68) and (1.38) 
EVIS = g2 + (§2 - g2)P*(Zi) ~ §2 ~ (1-52) 
Any information system having accuracy characteristics defined by 
case IV offers useless information. 
Equations (1.49) through (1.52) clearly demonstrate the dependence 
of the expected value of an information structure upon the prior 
probability of the states and, given that prior, the joint probability 
of message, state pairs which are in error. Given the prior, in 
figure 1.3, EVIS is increased by moves towards the origin in case I, 
and increased by moves away from the origin in case III. In both cases, 
iso-EVIS curves are linear with slope 
Vfi-
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Thus Y, dependent only upon the gain matrix, is, given the prior distri­
bution p*(z^), the rate at which the probabilities of the two types of 
errors can be traded one for another and equal information value be 
maintained. 
E, The Comparison of Information Structures 
There is no necessary one-to-one relationship between the set of 
potential messages and the set of payoff-relevant events. A component 
of the set X can also contain a description of the possible results of 
an experiment designed to provide the posterior distribution, p(z|y), 
needed for the application of the decision rule. In the language of 
statistics, the information structure Y is the set of rhsciva"; ^:s, 
the payoff relevant partition Z is the set of alteraative hypotheses, 
p(y|z) is the likelihood of observing y given that hypothesis z is true, 
and the triple [Y, Z, p(y}z)] is called the sample space. Our interest 
in this section is with the comparison of alternative information 
structures, given any payoff function w defined upon the set Z. 
Define, from (1,21) the gross Bayes risk from using information 
structure Y with payoff function w as 
u(P^,w) = E max w(z,c). (1.53) 
^ ceC 
Similarly, let 
u(p^ ,w) = E , max E^i , w(z,c) (1.54) 
ceC ' 
be the gross Bayes riuk from using information structure Y^. 
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We shall say that information structure Y is at least as informative 
as Y ' if 
u(P^,w) >_ u(P^ ,w) . 
Under what conditions is Y at least as informative as Y', and when 
does strict equality hold? 
DEFINITION 5. Y is said to be garbled (or cascaded) into Y' if 
the probability distribution of the message y", conditional on y and z, 
is independent of z, i.e. 
p(y''y,2) = p(y'|y). (1.55) 
Since, in general, 
pCy.y' lz)  = p(y |z)p(y'!y ,z)  
the definition of garbling also implies 
pCy.y' lz)  = p(ylz)p(y' |y) .  
Summing this condition over y gives 
p(y'|z) = Z p(y,y"|z) = s p(y|z)p(y"|y). (1.56) 
y y  
Intuitively, from (1.56), garbling implies that whenever observation y is 
observed the decision maker does not receive it; instead he receives 
the signal y"', which is randomized from y according to p(y'ly). Since 
the decision maker may not make as good a decision with y' as with y, 
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it is also intuitively clear that the information structure Y' cannot be 
more valuable than Y, that is 
u(P^,w) ^  u(P^ ,w). 
A proof of this as a theorem car» hz found in Blackwell and Girshick [12, 
chapter 12], and in Marschak and Miyasawa [49]. An extremely important 
special case of garbling is the following: 
either yzy" and pCy'jy) = 1 
or y#' and p(y'|y) = 0. (1.57) 
That is, each y e Y is contained in one j'^i". By definition 1, this is 
nothing more than saying that Y is finer than Y'. This leads to the 
Y Y' 
theorem: if Y is finer than Y', then u(P ,w) ^  u(P ,w). 
The above theorems are valid only for gross expected payoffs: it 
is easy to imagine an expensive Y and cheap Y' in which 
E max E I u[a(z,c) - k ] < E max E i u[a(z,c) - k J 
^ CeC ^ ^ ceC ^ 
where k^ and k^, are the costs of the structures. For reasons to be 
discussed in the next section on the cost of information, we postulate 
that if Y is finer than Y', then k^ _> k^,. Therefore, it is important 
Y Y 
to investigate the conditions in which u(P ,w) = u(P ,w) . Such 
conditions are provided by the concepts of sufficient partitions and 
sufficient statistics. 
A statistic is a function defined upon the s^ple space Y. The 
statistic y' = s(y) determines the partition 
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Y' " {y : s(y) - y'}. (1.58) 
Since for every y in Y there is a y' inrY' with y ç y% Y la a finer 
partition than Y'. 
If the distribution p(z|y) • p(z|y^) fer asch ycy' then the value 
of Y"* and Y is the same; Y" is said to be sufficient for Y, and s(y) 
is called a sufficient statistic. 
A necessary and sufficient condition that Y' be sufficient for Y 
and s(y) be a sufficient ntatistic is the famous factorization criterion: 
the likelihood function must be factorizable into a ccmponent dependent 
on z and a residual depending only on y, i.e. 
For proof of these theorems, see Blackwell and Glrshick [12, 
chapter 8] and Ralffa and Schlaifer [64, chapter 2]. 
For example, let the payoff-relevant state be the intensity of a 
Poisson process, and let a sanq>le of size N be taken, resulting in the 
information signal y • (y^, y^, y^), a point in n-space. 
The likelihood function is 
p(y|z) • g(s(y)jz)r(y) (1.59) 
0 <. Z < 00 
Then the partition 
Y' - {y : Ey^ - y'} 
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is a sufficient partition for Y and the statistic y' = Ey^ is a suffi­
cient statistic. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that a sufficient partition 
coarser than Y exists, in which case the coarser partition will result 
in a loss of informativeness. It may be important to estimate the loss 
of informativeness—for example, the coarser but insufficient information 
structure may be the only one available. Furthermore, two information 
structures may not be comparable with respect to fineness yet need to 
be compared with respect to value. 
The following simple example illustrates a situation in which two 
partitions must be compared with respect to value yet are not comparable 
with respect to fineness. 
Suppose our farmer has already applied his com herbicide on the 
surface. However, the weed-killer is not effective unless it somehow 
gets into the soil. This incorporation can be done in one of two ways, 
1) by running through the field with a disk at a cost of, say, $L per 
acre, or 2) by hoping that within a week rainfall of more than 1/4 inch 
will occur. If it rains enough, the $L incorporation cost is saved, 
but if it does not, the herbicide dees no good, production suffers, 
extra rotary hoeing must be undertaken, and so on. Supposa these 
losses are assessed at $C per acre. Of course, C > L. Let r denote 
the amount of rainfall during the week and define the state variable z 
as follows 
51 
2^ = {r = 0} 
Zg = {0 < r < 1/4} 
Zg = {r > 1/4} . 
Assume a prior probability distribution such that 
p( 2 . )  > 0 and Z p(z-) = 1. 
i=l 
The loss matrix is 
=1 =2 =3 
-2 L' 
and is obviously too fine. 
Suppose the farmer now has the choice of purchasing perfect 
information from one of two sources: Source Y will tell i^ether it 
will rain by more than 1/4 inch or not, and source Y' w-ill simply 
tell whether or not it will rain at all, Y and Y" are not comparable 
with respect to fineness. The respective loss, likelihood, joint, 
and posterior matrices are 
a) Loss 
Source Y 
2^11=2 Zg 
L 
C 
L 
0 
Source Y' 
L L 
C (C,0) 
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source i Source Y' 
b) Likelihood 
^1^2 
' 3  -
1 
0 
^2 
0 
c) Joint 
d) Posterior 
y z L  
1 
0 
'3 
0 
71 72 
pCz^y+pCzg) 0 
0 pCz^) 
y 7 L 
1 0 
0 1 
pCz^) 
0 p(z2)+p(zg)_ 
'1 
1 0 
1 
For source Y, the optimal decision rules are 
" Gji, and 
a* (72) « c^. 
Thus, 
u(?^,w) - -L[p(Zj^) + pCZg)]. 
For source Y% the optimal décision rules are 
<ï*(y£) • and 
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o*(yp » Cj^ if pCzglyp ^ L/c, 
» Cg if pCzglyp 1 L/C. 
Thus, 
U(P^ ,w) - -L if pCzgly^) ^  
= -{ LpCzg) + CpCzg) } if pCzglyg) ^  L/C. 
Thus, if p(-'2iy2^ "large" relative to the losses, the response to the 
forecast "it will rain" is still to incorporate. In this case, if 
p(zg) > 0, u(P^,w) > U(P^ ,w). If pCz^iyp is "small", when the 
message is "it will rain" the best action is not to incorporate, and, 
letting 6 = C -L > 0, we see that 
u(P^ ,w) » -Llp(z^) + pCzg)] - 6p (Zg) 
< - L[p(z^) + pCzg)] » u(p^,w), 
and again Y is more informative than T". 
Thus, source Y, by tailoring its Information to the needs of the 
decision maker, offers unambiguously more valuable information. It 
might be said that source Y offers more "decision relevant" information 
than source Y". 
The values of two information structures can always be compared 
by complete computation, but it may be quicker to compute the bounds 
on the difference in value due to Perez [58, 59, 60]. These bounds are 
based upon the information-theoretic concept of the equivocation of two 
probability distributions and are in fact valid in situations more 
general than those considered in this dissertation. 
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F. The Supply of Information 
Up to now, we have been concerned with the demand price of (cost­
less) information. We have talked about the values of alternative 
information structures as functions of things like payoffs, accuracy, 
and relevance. This section is concerned with :he supply of information: 
what structures are actually available, what determines their cost, 
and are enough resources devoted to their supply? 
On the demand side, the discussion of information has been rather 
abstract: sets of alteimative signals, their effects upon probability 
distributions, and optimal responses to them. The supply side of 
information is much more tangible: the information supplied each time 
is an actual symbol—a number, a group of words, a gesture—%bicb must 
be generated and transmitted to the decision maker for use in tha 
decision function. We shall discuss two general components of the supply 
of information: inquiry and transmission. 
The process of generating particular information signals is 
usually termed inquiry. Inquiry can take many forms: from the design 
and execution of a particular statistical experiment to the search for 
previously generated signals to the simple asking of a question. 
The end result of an toquiry is a signal y, which bears a relationship 
to the payoff relevant state z according to the likelihood function of 
the inquiry, p(y|z). 
Inquiry is the domain of the science of statistics. Statisticians 
have identified experiments which result in convenient likelihood 
functions, have produced techniques to insure that the assumptions 
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of the experiment which lead to the likelihood function are met (e.g. 
random sampling), and have offered many techniques for determining 
which z is in fact true. The latter techniques are still the subject 
of great debate among statisticians. One group of statisticians does 
not feel the prior distribution p(z) should be brought into the 
analysis; they estimate and test hypotheses about z using only the 
likelihood function p(y[z). For example, given a particular experi­
mental outcome y, the maximum likelihood estimator of z is the value of 
z which maximizes the value of the likelihood function. Another group 
of statisticians, the Bayesians, readily admits the use and usefulness 
of the prior distribution p(z). Clearly, this dissertation uses a 
Bayesian approach. 
Inquiry has many costs associated with it. 
First, there is the cost of model selection, or choice of the 
experiuieat to perform. This cost can be very cheap or very expensive, 
and is a function of the problem at hand. For example, if the payoff 
relevant state is the proportion z of defective components in a lot 
of size 100, and a sample of size n, with replacement, is to be taken, 
it is virtually certain that the likelihood of the observation of y 
defectives is 
p(y|z,n) = (y) z^(l-z)^"^. 
On the other hand, an example of possibly expensive model selection 
is the problem of econometric forecasting: find a linear combination 
of n variables which best explains the past movements of the payoff-
relevant variable. Then use forecasts of the n variables to generate 
the information signal y which is a forecast of the future z .  This 
search process of finding the n variables can get quite expensive. 
A second component to the cost of inquiry is sampling: how large 
a sample should be taken before the observations should be stopped and 
transmitted to the decision maker? It is well known that the larger 
the sample the more accurate can estimates of the parameters be, but 
larger samples usually cost more. Thus, the problem of optimal sample 
size is itself a decision problem, but what is the statistician's 
utility function? If the result of inquiry is to supply the message y 
and its likelihood p(y|z), and the value of the information to the 
user also depends upon this (as has been shown), then the utility 
function of the supplier must take into consideration the utility 
function of the user, just as the seller of any good must know what 
the buyer wants. 
If the cost per observation is constant, then the sampling pro­
cedure which has the minimum expected cost is Wald's method of sequential 
sampling. This was shown by Wald and Wolfowitz [82]. Sequential 
sampling was developed during World War II and was considered so 
important that it was deemed classified information! [80]. The idea is 
simply to take observations one at a time and decide after that to make 
a terminal decision or to take one more observation. The practical 
problem which limits the usefulness of sequential sampling is the 
determination of these stopping regions. 
Raiffa and Schlaifer [64] and DeGroot [15] present good analyses 
of the problem of optimal stopping rules and sample size. 
57 
Other costs of inquiry include costs of computation and collation 
of the experimental results, and perhaps storage and updating of the 
results. Use of sufficient statistics can clearly reduce the cost of 
storing data. Selection of models which admit sufficient statistics 
of fixed dimensionality also can allow for great computational economy, 
if a conjugate prior distribution on z can be assumed. The beauty of a 
conjugate prior p(z) is that the resulting posterior p(z[y') is a member 
of the same family of distributions as the prior, and can be computed 
very quickly. 
As an example of an inquiry, the theory of multiple classifications 
can be used to determine which of the payoff relevant states the supplier 
should identify, and, if the number of states is small, to calculate 
the likelihood matrix of the inquiry. We shall illustrate this with the 
simple two-state, two-act example of section D. 
Let the supplier's goal be to offer information as valuable as 
possible. By the symmetry of regions I and III, figures 1.3a and 1.3b, 
let the supplier attempt to offer information in region I. The supplier 
has a decision problem which has two states, z^ and z^, and two acts, 
which we identify as y£ = identification of and y^ = identification 
of z^. To maximize the user's gain from the information is equivalent 
to minimizing the user's loss from the information. To assess the loss 
matrix, recall the convention that h^ > g^ and h^ < g^» If the supplier 
sends y£, the user will take c^, and if z^ obtains, h^ is received and 
there is no loss. If obtains. will be received. However, 
correct information could have caused c^ to be taken and g^ to be 
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received. Therefore, the loss due to the incorrect information is 
§2 - h„. Making exactly the same argument for y^, the supplier's 
loss matrix is 
'l "^2 
1 'f 
fS bO o 
(1.60) 
n 1 O
 
L
_
 ACy'jz) = 
Let the inquiry be to determine y£ or y^ on the basi<? of ? single 
observation of N relevant variables. For example, to forecast whether 
or not it will be a dry summer, one could observe N climatological 
variables such as the number of sunspots and the position of the jet 
stream. The result of the experiment will be the N-tuple 
y = (y^, y2, ••• y^). Consider the following partition of this outcome 
into the set Y" = {y£,y2} where: 
yey£ if Z&(y£,z)p(z|y) _< Z2(y2,z)p(z|y) (1.61a) 
z z 
yey^ if 2:£(y£,z)p(z|y) _> E£(y2»z)p(z jy) . (1.61b) 
z z 
Using the prior distribution p(z), it is a simple matter to show that 
this is equivalent to the following likelihood-ratio test; 
p(y|z2) Hp(z^)] 
pTyfz^- [g2-h2][p(z2)] 
(1.62a) 
and 
^ [h^-gj^][p(zj^)3 
p(y|z^) - [g2-h2][p(z2)3 ' (1.62b) 
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In other words, the decision to identify or Zg can be made on the basis 
of the likelihood ratio of observing the observed outcome y under the 
two alternative hypotheses. 
Suppose that both p(y^, y,, ... y^jz^) and p(y^, y^, ... y^jzg) 
are distributed multivariate normal with the same varlance-covariance 
matrix but different means y^ = (y^^, ^IN^ ^nd 
^2 ^  (^21' ^ 22' ^2N^* k = 1, 2 
" ij 
O (y^ - (7j - y^j)] (i-») 
where is the determinant of the inverse of the matrix 
In this case, (see Blackwell and Girshick [12], p. 158) the procedure 
(1.62) reduces to 
N s(y )+s(y_) (h -g-)p(z ) 
yey£ if s(y) = j( g ^ - h ^ ) p ( z p  
and yey2 otherwise, irfiere 
^ ii - -X. = z a (y,.-y,.). (1.65) 
j=l ^ ^  
Furthermore, the statistic s(y) is normally distributed with mean 
s(y^) or s(y^) and common variance = s(y^) - s(y^). Therefore, the 
probabilities of error, in terms of the standard normal distribution are 
p(ydz,) = —^ /°° exp [-t^/2]dt (1.66) 
with 
and 
1 (h -g )p(z^) a 
" = -Ï; (gj-hpptzj) + T 
p( y : r i z , )  = e x p E - c ^ / 2 ] d t  ( 1 . 6 3 )  
/2Û 
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with 
(hl-gi)p(Zi) a 
s (1.69) V 
2 • 
Thus, the likelihood matrix p(y^|z) is determined, and, together 
with the known p(z), the joint distribution of messages and states, 
p(x), can be assessed for this inquiry, and the value of the information 
can easily be computed from the relations behind figures 1.3a and 1.3b. 
Model selection is the problem of choosing the N variables for the 
inquiry. Different variables will result in different values of informa­
tion to the user, not to mention different costs for the supplier. 
It should be stated that the statistic s(y) in equation (1.64) is 
not sufficient for y because, in general, 
A final component of the supply of information is the transmission 
of the message to the decision maker. This aspect includes not only the 
physical transfer of the information over some medium, but also possible 
retrieval of the symbols from storage, and efficient coding and decoding 
of the symbols for transference, A discussion of the transmission of 
information must bring up another quantitative measure of the information 
provided by a source: the change in the entropy function. 
The entropy function is a statistical parameter which depends 
solely on the probability distributions involved. The entropy of a 
discrete probability distribution over a set S is 
p(z|s(y)) f p(z|y). 
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H(S) = Sp(s) log p(s), (1.70) 
X 
The first use of entropy as a quantitative measure of information 
was made by Shannon [69]. Shannon's problem was to devise efficient 
coding principles to solve the fundamental problem of communication 
engineering: that of reproducing at one point a message selected at 
another point, with known accuracy. The literature which has grown up 
around this problem is known as "information theory" [1], [21]. 
Since entropy is a function of the probability of states but not 
the consequences of states, it cannot usually serve as a measure of 
the value of an information source. However, functions of entropy are 
used in information theory as measures of the amount of information 
transmitted. Marschak [47] has investigated the relationship between 
entropy and the cost of transmission of information. 
The theorems of information theory are very efficient and, together 
with the mass production of the hardware, have resulted in the following 
empirical conjecture: the marginal cost of transmitting information 
to another user is very small. On the other hand, inquiry can be quite 
expensive and after the fact is basically a sunk cost. This gives 
information certain public good characteristics: one person's use 
may not affect another person's ability to use the same message, and in 
some cases no one can be excluded from using the information. 
If information does indeed have public good aspects, then we are 
entitled to ask, "Does the free market provide the socially optimal 
amount of resources to information production?" This question was the 
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topic of an interesting exchange between Demsetz [16] and Arrow [4], 
It is also considered by Hirshleifer [31] and Marshall [51]. 
To be sure, the supplier of information is taking a risk: the 
risk that the inquiry will not provide valuable information. This risk 
lessens as soon as the distribution p(x) is assessed, because then the 
expected value of the information can be computed. Arrow argued that 
if information is a commodity, and its cost of transmission is very low, 
the optimal allocation calls for very wide distribution. However, 
since the output cannot be predicted beforehand, invention and research 
(inquiry) is a risky business, and, because of limited and imperfect 
risk shifting devices, the riskiness leads to underinvestment in 
information production. 
The supplier of information may or may not desire this wide 
distribution. The advertiser constantly beams his message, but in many 
cases the payoff to the user depends upon the number of users having 
access to the information. Lave [41] considered a case like this. 
If a single California raisin grower had better weather forecast 
information, he could increase his production and profits. If all 
growers received this more accurate information, total production 
would increase, but total revenue would decrease because of an inelastic 
market demand curve for raisins. 
The Federal government, of course, provides massive amounts of 
information. Surprisingly, the government does not centralize this 
data for easy access by users. The author testifies from personal 
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experience that it can be very difficult to track down publicly 
available Information in Washington. Much of these data is centralized 
and maintained by private industry for sale to subscribers. 
An important theoretical and empirical analysis of publicly issued 
information was presented by Hayami and Peterson [29]. In a simple 
supply and demand model, the Marshallian concept of consumers' surplus 
is used to measure the social loss due to the market repercussions 
resulting from inaccuracy in USDA crop forecasts. By estimating the 
demand curves, they then compute the value of improvements in the accuracy 
of USDA production forecasts for a large number of agricultural 
commodities. This analysis was discussed by Smith and Scherr [72]. 
Before one can determine the socially optimal dissemination of 
information, one must know the impact of information upon the overall 
allocation of resources. A very large literature in economics is 
concerned with the implications of dropping the perfect information 
assumption in economic theory, A general equilibrium approach is 
given by Radner [63]. 
If the actors in the social system do not have perfect information 
about opportunities, they may allocate resources to search until they 
have enough information. Search models were first introduced by Stigler 
[73]. A survey is provided by Rothschild [66], On the other hand, 
Hayek [30] argued that the price system is a marvel which economizes 
on the information needs of each individual actor, A related idea is 
the efficient markets hypothesis, surveyed by Fama [20], This literature 
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maintains that if a market is efficient, all current knowledge about 
the future price in the market is embodied in the current price. Only 
through the revelation of new information can the market price change. 
Since this new information is as likely to be bullish as bearish, 
market price is hypothesized to obey a martingale process, i.e., 
E(p^^^) = E(p^). Mandelbrot [45] has built a model in which market 
price dances as information is revealed over time. Garbade, Pomrenze, 
and Silber [26] empirically tested the question of whether or not 
securities dealers glean market information from other securities 
dealers' bids. 
Whether or not there is optimal allocation of resources to informa­
tion production is a very complex issue. One thing seems clear: the 
industry is large. In his dated but still excellent monograph, 
Machlup [44] estimated that in 1958 the "knowledge industry" had between 
23 percent and 29 percent of the total GNP of the United States. 
G. The Meta Decision 
Up to now, the decision maker has been identified with the individual 
who reacts to the information he receives through his decision rule. 
Clearly, the decision on what information will be received and what 
the decision rule will be is a completely different decision problem. 
Marschak [47] has used the term "meta-decision" to describe this 
higher level decision of optimally supplying the demand for information. 
The meta decision involves the simultaneous choice of an optimal informa­
tion system: optimal inquiry, storage, updating, transmission, and 
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choice of decision rule. A slightly modified version of Harschak*s 
system is presented in figure 1.4. 
Let the set of feasible information systems be E. Associated with 
each eeE is a cost for that system, denoted k^. Extending (1.21), 
given e, the expected net utility of the system is 
V(e) = {E max E , u[a(z,c) - k ]|e}. (1.71) 
y cec ® 
The meta-decider must choose the system \Aiich maximizes this expected 
net utility 
V* = max {E max E , u[a(z,c) - k ]|e}. (1.72) 
eeE y ceC ® 
It is very interesting and important to note that, when the costs 
of decision making are considered (e.g. salary of the decision maker), 
the meta-decider must consider choosing a randomized decision rule. 
Hiring a decision maker who never makes mistakes may be much more 
expensive than hiring one who sometimes does. The net payoff of the 
system with a mistake-prone decision maker may be higher than one with 
a decision îuaker who methodically makes the right decision. The 
importance of this point is highlighted by empirical work on limits 
of the capacity of human beings to process information. Miller [52] 
found that for unidimensional stimuli, the ability of humans to receive, 
process, and remember information is about seven bits. Simon [71] has 
presented a theory of "bounded rationality" which attempts to consider 
such limitations. 
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H. Other Literature on the Economics of Information 
The field of the economics of information is relatively new, but 
has grown rapidly in the last three decades. At least three journals 
have recently devoted entire issues to the field: 1) the Swedish 
Journal of Economics, volume 76, March, 1974; 2) the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, volume 90, November, 1976; and 3) the Review of Economic 
Studies, volume 44, October, 1977. 
This section should not be viewed as a thorough literature review. 
It is designed solely to give the reader a feeling for the theoretical 
and empirical work which has been done in the area of the value of 
information. For more conçlete reviews, see Bandyopadhyay [9], 
Hirshleifer [32], and Lawrence [42]. 
The rigorous theoretical foundations for all problems involving 
decision making under uncertainty were laid by Von Neumann and Morgenstem 
[79], The first comparison of information structures was made by 
Bohnenblust, Shapley, and Sherman [13] in 1949. Work progressed 
rapidly with the work of Blackv/ell [11] and Savage [68] from the view­
point of statistics, and Marschak [48] from the viewpoint of economics. 
Raiffa and Schlaifer [64] presented a complete analysis of the 
value of information problem for the case in \^ich the utility of each 
act is linear in the state variable. An application of this type of 
analysis is given in chapter 2. 
LaValle [40] also offered an important theoretical discussion. 
Assume a decision maker owns or is considering buying a decision resulting 
from a partition J. The behavior of the prior and posterior selling 
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prices under different assumptions concerning the degree of fineness of 
the partition and the attitude towards risk of the decision maker is 
discussed. 
Szaniawski [74] investigated the value of perfect information 
under alternative assumptions concerning the criterion used in the 
problem, 
Gould [27] considered the relationship between the probability 
distribution over the states and the value of information. He proved 
that the value of information reaches its maximum, everything else the 
same, given a finite set of states and a k-component vector of decision 
variables, when a nonzero probability is assigned to at most k+1 states. 
Work on the value of infoirmation in multiperiod stochastic control 
problems was done by Miyasawa 154], AstrSm [6], and Marschak and Radner 
[50], among others. This will be the topic of chapter 3. 
Nelson [55] investigated, for the perfect competitor, the relation­
ship between the goodness of fit of a regression and the value of the 
predictions of price made by the regression. 
Feltham and Demski [22] have applied Marschak's approach to solve 
certain information problems of the accountant. 
Nelson and Winter [56] discussed the economics of the weather 
forecast system, 
Figlewski [23] presented an interesting empirical analysis of the 
effects of the published forecasts of professional handicappers at a 
horse race. 
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Baquet, Salter, and Conklin [10] derived nonlinear utility functions 
for several orchardists in Oregon and confuted the value of frost 
forecasts. They found that risk aversion increased the value of the 
information. 
Perrin [61] computed the value of soil test information in Brazil 
to be as much as $30 per hectare. 
Howard [34] investigated the value of information about competitor's 
bids in a sealed bidding process. 
A look at the form of (1.70) suggests that there may be decision 
problems in which changes in entropy can serve as a measure of the value 
of information, if the utility function is logarithmic. Such a problem 
"as formulated by Kelly [38], If a gambler (or investor) attempts to 
maximize the exponential rate of growth of his capital by betting on 
the basis of messages received from an information system, the rate of 
growth of the gambler's capital is equal to the rate of transmission 
of the information, in Shannon's sense. The criterion of maximizing 
the exponential rate of growth of capital has become known in portfolio 
theory as the "Kelly criterion". The value of information with 
logarithmic utility is discussed by Arrow [5], 
A completely different application of entropy to the economics of 
information has been made by Theil and his associates [76]. Instead of 
interpreting the arguments of the entropy function as probabilities, 
they can be interpreted as the shares of some total quantity. This 
approach has great application in econometrics, for example, in measuring 
the loss due to aggregation. 
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II. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION TO 
THE COMMERCIAL BANKER 
A. Introduction 
Financial institutions are sometimes conceived of as agencies which 
allow great economies in the information necessary for the proper 
channeling of savings into investment. However, in order to provide 
this service efficiently, the intermediary itself must gather information. 
Knowledge of the credit worthiness of customers, knowledge of the quantity 
of loans which will be demanded at each interest rate, and knowledge of 
deposit inflows and outflows are all necessary for the efficient 
management of the firm. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate 
the determinants of the value of information about these factors to the 
commercial bank. 
These kinds of questions can be addressed using the tools of 
Statistical Decision Theory. Unfortunately, Decision Theory is not as 
powerful a tool as one would wish: the complexities of many economic 
problems quickly result in a loss of mathematical tractability. For 
that reason, the overall analytic solution to the informational 
problem will not be given, rather I shall look at various bits and 
pieces of the general problem. Section 5 constructs a simple stochastic 
theory of the loan demand and deposit supply of the commercial bank. 
Section G considers the information needs of the bank's loan officer, 
and computes the value to him of information about potential borrowers. 
Section D builds a simple model of the banking firm, and computes the 
value to the banker of perfect and imperfect information about loan 
demand and deposit supply. 
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B. A Theory of the Loan and Deposit Components 
of the Portfolio 
Recent literature in the economics of bank management has stressed 
the idea of the customer-deposit relationship [33], [83]. A large 
percentage of the loans made by the bank is made to regular customers 
who also hold deposits with the bank. Should the bank not be able to 
service these customers' loan demands at some point, the customers may 
become angry, pull out their deposits, and cease doing business with the 
bank. This can result in a substantial loss of profits in the long run. 
The implication is that the banker should service the loan requests 
of all credit-worthy customers, whatever the cost. In other words, the 
loan demand of credit-worthy customers should be viewed as an uncontrol­
lable stochastic variable. Control variables for the credit officer are 
the interest rates charged, compensating balance requirements, repayment 
terms, points, and so on. In this paper, we will assume that the 
interest rate on loans, r^, is a proxy for all negotiable loan terms. 
This assumption is given empirical support by Harris [28]. The bank is 
assumed to be a monopolist, but not a perfectly discriminating 
monopolist. The interest rate must be chosen ex-ante in this model. 
Suppose credit-worthy borrowers enter the bank according to a 
Poisson process with intensity function X^(t). The intensity function 
depends upon time to allow for seasonality and trend. By time t, a 
random number N(t) of customers have entered the bank. At a fixed 
interest rate r^, each one of these customers demands a loan of a size 
L^, which is viewed as a drawing from an arbitrary distribution L of 
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loan sizes. The total portfolio of new loans by time t is therefore 
d K(t) 
I. (t) = E L.. (2.1) 
i=l ^ 
It can be shown, (Parzen [57], pp. 128-130) that the random variable L^(t) 
is a nonhomogeneous compound Poisson process with one-dimensional 
characteristic function 
4i , (u) = expl/i^ X^(s)ds[<{> (u) - 1]}, (2.2) 
L*(t) " ^ 
where u is the argument of the characteristic function, s is a dumny 
variable for time, and $^(u) is the characteristic function of the 
distribution of the size of loan demanded. The characteristic function 
contains all information about the probability distribution of L^(t), 
and can be used to determine the moments of the distribution, if they 
2 
exist. If 2[L^] < then equation (2.2) says the mean value function is 
E[L'^(t)] = /Q X^(s)ds E[L], (2.3) 
and the variance of the new loan portfolio is 
Var[Ld(t)] = /Q X^(s)ds ElL^]. (2.4) 
It must be assumed the process N(t) and the sequence are independent 
of each other. 
Finally, let each individual loan repayment be some proportion 
of loans at (t-1): 
L^(t) = a^L(t-l). 
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The overall loan portfolio at time t is therefore 
N^Ct) 
L(t) = Z  L. + (1 - a )L(t - 1), (2.5) 
i=N^(t-l) ^ ^ 
in other words, new loans which occurred between t-1 and t plus all 
unmatured loans at time t-1. 
Likewise, suppose depositors enter the bank with intensity function 
X^vt), and change their deposit accounts by D^, where D is a random 
variable with arbitrary distribution. Total deposits at time t are 
therefore 
NgCt) 
D(t) = D(0) + S D., (2.6) 
i=l ^ 
which is a stochastic process with mean value function 
E(D(t)) = /Q X2(s)ds E(D) + D(0) (2.7) 
and variance 
Var(D(t)) = /Q X2(s)ds E(D^). (2.8) 
There is no reason to expect the processes described by (2.5) and (2.6) 
to be independent. As R. Robinson [65] argues, they are likely to be 
negatively correlated. The agricultural banker, for example, will find 
high loan demand coupled with high deposit outflows in the spring as 
the crop is financed, and the reverse situation in the fall. This 
correlation must also be considered. 
74 
C. The Value of Information about Potential Borrowers 
Almost ten years ago, Aigner and Sprenkle [2] first investigated the 
effects of information about the default risk of potential customers. 
Their stated purpose was to consider the effects of information on 
optimal bank behavior, using as a theoretical device the idea of an 
"information function"—a production function of sorts which relates 
information input to the returns from its application. How does informa­
tion affect returns? Aigner and Sprenkle argue that the more information 
a lender has the more accurate will be the estimate of the frequency 
distribution of the returns from the loan. Since lenders tend to be 
conservative, this can be interpreted as a natural overestimation of 
the probability of default, with additional information tending to 
reduce this estimate to some minimum value from above. In this scheme, 
an information function relates the probability of default, P, to the 
quantity of information available, q, and the loan size That is, 
P = f(q, L^), (2.9) 
with the following specification on the signs of the partial derivatives: 
3P . „ 3^P < > 0 T 0. (2.10) 
i 
31.: > 
Without even considering what exactly q physically is, it is clearly 
an undesirable constraint that further information cannot increase the 
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probability of default. Aigner and Sprenkle mention this in a footnote, 
but then assume the problem away. In the following analj:sis of the role 
of information in credit analysis, the assumptions (2.10) will not be 
made. 
The following assumptions, all made by Aigner and Sprenkle, will 
be retained: 
1) the rate of interest, r^, is a proxy for all negotiable loan 
terms; 
2) given r^, customers enter the bank and request a one-period 
loan of size L^; 
3) the loan officer has two options—to grant or to refuse the 
requested amount ; 
4) there are only two possible outcomes of an approved loan— 
complete repayment of interest and principle, or total default; 
and 
5) the decision criterion is one-shot maximization of expected 
profits from the transaction, with r , the rate of return on 
G 
government securities, as opportunity cost. If no government 
securities can be sold, substitute r^, the rate paid on borrowed 
funds, as the relevant opportunity cost. 
Clearly, maximization of expected profits is equivalent to minimiza­
tion of expected loss. If the loan is approved and defaulted, the bank 
loses the principle, L^, and the interest it could have earned on the 
principle, had it put the money in securities. If the banker rejects 
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a loan that would have been paid back, he loses not only the excess 
revenue loans give over securities, r^ - r^, but he also suffers a good 
will loss of Y percent due to the customer-deposit relationship. 
Therefore, the loss matrix, denoted £,(c,z), is 
State 
Act = repayment = default 
c, = accept loan 
Cg = reject loan 
We assume no transactions costs. 
Whether or no" the loan vili be repaid is, of course, a random 
event. However, information can and must be gathered about the applicant 
in order to make the most economically feasible estimate of p(z|y), 
the posterior probability distribution of the payoff-relevant state, 
given the information. What are the sources of information, and how 
can this estimate be made? 
The credit department of the bank is charged with gathering, 
processing, and interpreting information about the loan applicant. It 
is often said that the credit department makes its decision on the 
basis of the characteristics of the borrower summarized by the "C's of 
credit." How many "C's" there are depends upon one's ability at 
alliteration, but Robinson offers six: character, capacity, capital, 
collateral, coverage, and condition. Information about these factors 
can be gathered from a number of sources. First, from financial state­
ments: various financial ratios, both actual and pro forma, can be 
(1 + 
(2.11) 
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struck. Second, the bank can undertake "trade checking," that is, 
asking suppliers of the applicant about things like payment habits. 
Third, local credit bureaus store knowledge about past financial 
dealings of the customer. Fourth, various firms make it their business 
to supply information: the bond rating services. Dun and Bradstrast, 
and Robert Morris Associates come to mind. 
The problem is to determine how much money should be spent on the 
credit analysis. The computation of the value of the credit analysis 
can be computed straightforwardly from the analysis of chapter I. That 
is, the value of the information can be found as a function of the 
probabilities of the two types of errors using the results of section D, 
and these probabilities can be computed using the discriminant analysis 
presented :lr. section E. However, the value of. information still cannot 
be computed until after the inquiry, and hence that approach somewhat 
begs the question of how much the information is worth, before the 
inquiry. However, by exploiting the assumption of only two payoff 
relevant states, with the addition of one more input into the analysis, 
the prior expected value of the credit analysis can be computed. 
For notational simplicity, denote by P the posterior probability 
of default, that is, 
P = pCzgly)' (2.12) 
From the loss matrix (2.11), as a function of P, the posterior expected 
loss from each act is 
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Egjy ^(c^.z) = 0[1 - P] + [1 + r^lL^P = [1 + rglL^P, (2.13a) 
and 
Egjy tCcg.z) = Ir, - Tg 4- y]L^[1 - P] + 0[P] 
= [r^ - rg 4- y]L^[1 - P]. (2.13b) 
This expected loss is seen to be linear in P. 
As a function of P, the expected loss from each act is graphed in 
Fie-:.; 2.1. 
Loss $ c^ = accept 
V. 
c^ = reject 
1 0 P 
Figure 2.1. Expected loss as a function of P. 
The optimal act to take, as a function of P, is the lower envelope 
of these curves. The breakeven value, where the optimal act changes 
from acceptance to rejection, is the probability of loan default at 
which 
^z|y ^(^1'^) = ^z|y ^(c^lz). (2.14) 
Substitution of (2.13) into (2.14) defines this breakeven value P- as 
b 
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or 
[1 + r^lL^P^ = [r^ - Tg + Y]L.[1 - P^], (2.15a) 
r, - r + Y 
^ = 1 + r, + Y" (2.15b) 
Before the credit analysis, the posterior probability of default 
is itself a random variable, a function of the as yet unknown information 
signal y. If the decision maker is willing to provide a prior distribu­
tion for the posterior probability of default, then an estimate of the 
val-ae of the credit analysis can be made before knowing the actual 
results of the inquiry. 
Let the decision maker provide such a distribution, denoted by f(?). 
The value of P can, of course, only range between zero and one: the 
Beta distribution, with parameters n and r, 
f(p|r,n) = P="^(l-?)*"^"-. 0 < P < 1, n>r>0, (2.16) 
has this property, and also is a very rich distribution; just about any 
prior beliefs can be captured with appropriate choice of n and r. The 
Beta distribution is discussed in great detail by Raiffa and Schlaifer 
[64]. 
From (2.13), a computation of the unconditional expected loss from 
each act 
EpE^jy Kc^.z) = /q (l+rg)L^Pf(P)dP = [l+rgjLj, (2.17a) 
and 
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= [rj^-rg+Y]L^[l-P], (2.17b) 
tells us that in this specification, the prior decision turns upon the 
mean or expected probability of default. The mean of the Beta distribu­
tion is P = —. Based upon P, a prior decision is chosen. The information 
from further investigation will result in a final estimate of P, and 
perhaps a different decision. The probability that after the analysis 
P will be within an epsilon of, say, P*, is 
iCP)dP. 
First of all, consider perfect information. Perfect information would 
be to be told P = 0 or 1. If the prior act were to reject, and word 
came P = 1, that information had no value. On the other hand, if word 
came that P = 0, the information would have value, since it would 
result in a different action and a lower expected loss from the decision. 
Roughly speaking, the value of information in a decision problem is the 
difference between the expected loss under the optimal action without 
the information and the expected loss under the optimal action with the 
information. This quantity is nonnegative. 
As an interesting example, consider the social problem of redlining. 
Redlining is a well-documented practice in which commercial banks refuse 
to make loans in certain (usually decaying) areas of the city. In the 
context of this model, this can be explained by the statement that the 
Si 
banker views the probability of default as so high that the loan must 
be rejected. The expected loss froF- the optimal decision is then 
[r^ - rg + y]L^[l - P] = EpE^j^ ACc^xZ). One solution to the problem 
is governmental guarantees of loans made in redlined areas. A guarantee 
can be interpreted as a message that P = 0. Conditional upon the message 
P = 0, the posterior optimal action is to accept the loan, the expected 
loss is now 0, and the value to the bank of the loan guarantee is 
given by the distance on figure 2.1. That is, the prior optimal act 
is to reject, and rejecting a loan with no default risk results in the 
loss (r^ - rg + y)L^> so the conditional value of the message P = 0 is 
= (r^ - Tg = Y)L^ - 0 = [r^ - rg 4- (2.18) 
This quantity, of course, is simply the excess revenue the bank makes 
from loans over securities. Applying the theory of section B, if we 
consider only customers from redlined areas, the value of the program 
to the bank up to time t, using (2,1), (2,3), and (2,4) is expected 
to be 
N(t) N(t) 
E[V(t)] = E[ Z v . ]  = [r^ - r_ + y] S L. 
i=l ^ ^ i=l ^ 
= [r^ - rg + y] /q X(s)ds E[L], (2.19) 
and has variance 
Var[V(t)] = [r^ - rg + y]^ X(s)ds E[l^]. (2.20) 
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The quantity V(t) represents only the value of the guarantee program 
to the bank. To figure the social value of the program, in the sense 
of Fox [24], one must add in the increase in social income in the 
community due to richer behavior settings, and subtract out government 
losses due to the defaults. This would require specification of the 
government's loss function, but, for exançle, suppose in fact P = 1 
for some individual. Then as a result of the program, the taxpayer 
loses [1 + r„]L^, the bank gains [r^ - r^ + y]L^, and, ignoring redistri­
bution effects, the net monetary loss 
- r^ + y]L^ - [1 + = [r^ - 2T^ + Y - 1]L^ (2.21) 
would have to be compared with the monetary value of the increase in 
social income from the guarantee in order to see if the program is worth 
it. 
Perfect information, in the sense used above, is probably rare. 
More realistically, the stochastic nature of the future forces the 
decision maker to settle for imperfect information; a nondefinitive 
posterior probability of default. 
Two cases must be considered, (1) P < P, and (2) P > P . D D 
In Case I, the prior optimal act is to accept the loan. Since any 
posterior message P* < P^ will result in the same action, these messages 
have no value. On the other hand, any posterior message that P* > P^ 
will result in rejection of the loan. The value of messages like this 
is typified by the amount in figure 2.1, This gain, as a function of 
P is 
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= [1 + - [r^ - Tg + - P] 
= [1 + r ]L P + [r - r + y]L-P - [r_ - (2.22) 1 IRFV? X  ^
This situation is pictured in Figure 2.2, 
Figure 2.2. The distribution f(P), and the conditional value of the 
message P. 
The breakeven value is P^, as in (2.15a), 
[1 + r^lL.P^ + [r^_ - rg + yJL.P^ = [r^ - + y]L, . (2.23) 
We seek as a function of P^, so substituting (2.23) into (2.22) we 
get 
Gi = + ^ G^V + - ^ G + - [1 + Wb 
" ^G ^  "Y^^i^b 
[1 + + YIL^P - [1 + r^ + Y]\P^ 
l l  + T^ + YlL^lP - P^] 
= [1 + + YlL^ maxlP - P^, 0], (2.24) 
since, in Case I, G. =0 when P < P, . X D 
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is the conditional value of information, conditional upon a value 
of P. To find the expected value of the inforation, we expect over P. 
The expected value of the information contained in the credit investiga­
tion is, in Case I, 
EVI = [1 4- r^ 4- y]L^ /p [P - P^]f(P)dP if P < P^. (2.25) 
b 
Similarly, in Case II we get 
EVI = [1 + r^  4' y]L^ [P^ - P]f(P)dP if ? > P^. (2.26) 
These integrals can easily be evaluated using mechoJs discussed by 
Raiffa and Schlaifer. 
The quantity represented by (2.25) or (2.26) represents the maximum 
amount the banker should pay in a credit investigation about a potential 
customer. Note that it is an increasing function of L^, r^, and y, and 
depends upon the opportunity cost of loans only througli the breakeven 
value P^. The economic interpretation of the equations is that the 
expected value of information, under the assumptions, is proportional 
to the sum of money which will be repaid, weighted by a function of the 
probability volume that a different action will be taken as a result of 
the investigation. 
A large number of customers of the bank will already be so well 
known to the bank that virtually no chance is given that the loan will 
be defaulted. The next section will concern in the main these prime 
customers, i.e., those who allow the bank very little risk of default, 
and so considerable savings in information costs. 
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D. The Value of Perfect and Imperfect Information 
in a Simple Model of the Commercial Bank 
In the past twenty years, there have been a large number of both 
stochastic and deterministic models of the commercial bank. However, 
many people feel there has never been an acceptable general mo>lel of the 
banking firm. The reason for this is simple: banking is such a complex 
process that it is difficult to keep track of everything that would be 
going on in a realistic model. Therefore, the tack taken by most authors 
is to simplify the general model to the point where thsy can zero in on 
one particular issue. Thus, for example, some papers are concerned 
with explanation of credit rationing, [35], [37], [43], others are 
concerned with the multiperiod implications of a continuing customer 
relationship [83], and still others analyze the impact of regulatory 
constraints on the bank's portfolio [53]. The model of this section is 
designed to zero in on the determinants of the value of information 
about some of the random variables faced by the bank's management. 
The cost of doing that is a certain loss of realism. 
Using a notation which will be explained in a moment, at time t, 
the bank's current position can be represented by the following 
simplified balance sheet: 
A L. + K la 
XR, 
*-9 • 
^t,. 
K 
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where RR = required reserves, XR = excess reserves, G = government 
securities, L = loans, D = deposits, B = borrowing, and K = capital. 
The balance sheet identity is 
RR + XR + G + L = D + B + . (2.27) 
The story that I tell is this: The banker begins the planning 
horizon with an exogenously given portfolio from the last period, which 
I denote P(t - 1, 2). At the beginning of time t, he must choose the 
decision variables. He sets RR ^, XR ., G ., and B L and D are U Y X  U Y X  T Y X  L  9  J -
viewed as random variables, but he must choose r^, the rate he charges 
on loans, and r^, the implicit rate he pays on deposits. At this point, 
he has the portfolio denoted by P(t, 1). Immediately thereafter, the 
bank opens up, the particular realizations of the random variable 
become known, matured loans are paid back, and the banker must adjust 
his portfolio to meet all customers' demands. The resulting portfolio, 
P(t, 2), is the portfolio on which interest is earned, and is also the 
portfolio inherited by the next period. 
In this section, the following simplifying assumptions will be 
made, in order to compute analytically the value of various kinds of 
prediction about the random variables L and D: 
I) The banker is risk-neutral^ and all loan demand comes from prime 
customers, so there is no credit-information cost. Profits over 
the period will be 
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In other words, profits are the sum of interest on securities, 
interest on new loans demanded between t and t+1, and interest 
earned on unmatured loans over the period, less interest 
payments on borrowings and the cost of maintaining deposits. 
2) Required reserves are alvays a fixed proportion of deposits. 
RR. = kD . (2.29) 
3) Transactions costs from changing the portfolio are zero; hence, 
there is never any reason to hold excess reserves. 
XR = 0. (2.30) 
t , . 
4) The loan demand curve is linear; the quantity of loans demanded 
can be choked off by a higher effective loan rate. Usury 
ceilings are ignored. The total amount of new loans given out 
over the period is assumed to obey the following functional 
relation: 
N^(t+1) 
= [ Z Lj - br. . (2.31) 
i=N^(t) ^ 
This is a slight modification of the theory of section B. The 
total loan portfolio is 
= <.2 + 
5) The deposit supply curve is a linearly increasing function of r^, 
the implicit rate paid on all deposits; specifically. 
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N2(t+1) 
- D. , + [ Z D ] + dr^. (2.33) 
t,^ t,l 1=^2 (t) ° 
6) I must assume that the rate on government securities and the rate 
on borrowing are equal: 
rg = rg. (2.34) 
This last assumption is not as odious as it may first seem; banks are 
sometimes accused of borrowing at the discount window for profit, and 
today, the differential between treasury bills and certificates of 
deposit is usually less than one percent. With this assumption, we can 
just think of B as "negative G" and drop it from the profit function 
(2.28), and the balance sheet, (2.27). 
Substituting (2.31), (2.32). (2.33), and (2.34) into (2.28) gives 
"t ° Vt.2 + 
- Vt.l - - 4- (2-35) 
From the balance sheet identity (2.27), using (2.30) and (2.34), 
®t,2 ®t,2 \,2 " ^t,2 \,2' 
Using (2.29), (2.31), (2.32), and (2.33), this becomes 
«t,2 = O - - "t 'h,! 
- ZU + br^. (2.36) 
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Equation (2.36) tells us that the number of governments the banker will 
wind up with depends upon the realized value of the random difference 
N2(t+1) N^(t+1) 
[(1 - k) 2 D. - Z LJ. 
1=^2(t) ^ i=N^(t) ^ 
The banker will have government securities left if G „ > 0 or 
[(1 - k)ZD^ - ZU] > -(1 - k)fD^ 1 + dr^] - 2 
+ (2-37) 
If the inequality is reversed, the resources of the bank are so drained 
that all G have been sold, and the bank must borrow the needed funds. 
However, by assumption, this borrowing is charged off at the rate r_, so 
the realized sign of G « does not really matter. However, if the bank 
t,^ 
did not want to borrow too often, these liquidity considerations could 
be handled by a chance constraint such as 
Prob{[(l - k)ED. - ZL^] > -(1 - k)[D^ ^ + dr^] - g 
+ (1 - a^)L^ ^ - br^} > o. (2.38) 
However, these liquidity considerations will be ignored. 
For now, substitution of (2.36) into (2.35) gives the final form 
of the profit as a function of the remaining two decision variables, 
't = + Kt.2 - (1 -
+ - "'T! + "t.l - - "4- (2-39) 
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We will now consider the expected value of perfect and imperfect 
information about the random variables. 
With no further information than the inherent distribution of the 
random variables, expected profits, using a bar over the random variable 
to denote the mean, are 
MV = rg[(l - k)(D;_i + ZD. + dr„) + - (1 -
- ËL. + br^] + ÎL. - br^ + r£(l -
- "D Dt.l - >^0 - ^ 4- ".40) 
and are maximized with respect to r and r, by the decision rules (2.41) 
and (2.42). Since, for a maximum. 
- V + = 0, 
it follows that 
+ (2-41) 
Similarly, it must hold that 
^ ' V - ' 0' 
and thus 
<2.42) 
In this model, in the loan market the bank is viewed as a monopolist 
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with Tg as marginal cost, and in the deposit market as a monopsonist, also 
with rg as marginal cost. 
Substitution of (2.41) and (2,42) back into the expected profit 
function (2.40) gives the indirect payoff function; expected profits 
when best use is made of no further information are: 
Next, suppose the banker had perfect information about the random 
variables. That is, suppose he is told exactly what SL^ and will 
be. Then, the profit function (2.39) is maximized by the decision 
rules (2.44) and (2.45). 
For a maximum it must hold that 
(2.43) 
t 
= r^b + - 2br^ = 0, 
3r. 
L 
thus 
(2.44) 
Similarly, it must hold that 
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thus, 
'S = (tcd - °t.l - (2.45) 
Substitution of the decision rules (2.44) and (2.45) into (2.39) gives 
maximum profits as a function of the realization of the random variables: 
+ 2 + Tgb - "2 4b ' (2.46) 
Before the information arrives, these profits are expected to be, 
2 — 2 
recalling that for any random variable X, E[X ] = Var[X] + [X] , 
E 't = 4 - k)rG(Dt.i + ".) + -^ 
(r£ + rgXl - cij.)L|,^j^ + rgK^ 2 + ^  
- I TG ZLi + ;^ [Var(SL^) + (ZL J^]. (2.47) 
The expected value of this perfect information structure, in the sense 
of the maximum amount the banker should pay in order to receive the 
exact future values of the random variables, is given by the difference 
between (2.47) and (2.43): 
EVIS = E max - max E = — Var(EL_.) + ^  Var (SD^), 
^L'^D 
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and, by (2.4) and (2.3) 
EVIS = ^  A^(s)ds E[L^] + A^(s)ds E[D^]. (2.48) 
It is not surprising to find that the expected value of perfect 
information is a function of the variance of the random variables and 
the slopes of the demand and supply curves. Information has valus to 
the extent that it alters actions and consequently payoffs. The more 
variable is, say, loan demand, the more it pays to try to control it, 
but the more elastic the demand curve (the larger is b), the less 
valuable the information. 
It is a little much to ask any information source to predict the 
exact realization of many stochastic variables. It may simply be 
impossible, or it may be possible but too costly. There are tradeoffs 
between the precision and the cost of information. 
One common approach, used for example in the context of a bank 
model by Ealtensberger and Milde [8], is to postulate an "information 
function." The variance of the random variable is said to be a 
decreasing function of the quantity of information, q, gathered. 
This is not the conceptualization of the nature of information 
used in this dissertation. Information is conceived of as the flow 
into the stock of knowledge. Knowledge is embodied in the current 
probability distribution of the random variable. Information which 
increases the variance of this distribution can have just as much value 
as information which decreases it. 
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The probability distributions of the random variables in this 
dissertation are considered to be inherent in the stochastic nature of 
the world; the only thing that can change these distributions is 
structural change. What an information source must do is to predict 
each realization of the random variables with the best feasible precision. 
We have already discussed the worth of a source which can tell exactly 
what the realization will be, but more likely, the source is asked to 
"name an interval" within which the realization will lie. As the number 
of possible intervals which could be named is infinite, it is virtually 
impossible to compute the value of an information source like this, 
unless some special assumptions are made about the nature of the source. 
To avoid cumbersome algebra, assume deposit levels cannot be 
controlled because by law r^ = 0. In addition, let = 1, and choose 
units so b = 1/2. These assumptions make absolutely no difference to 
the conclusion. Then the profit function (2.39) can be written 
+ (r^ - rç)ZL^ " f (2.49) 
Furthermore, let the Poisson distributed random variable ZL^ be 
approximated by a uniformly distributed random variable between A and B. 
That is ~ u(A, B). As is well-known, the variance of a random 
2 
variable distributed uniformly between A and B is (B - A) /12. Also, 
assume loans and deposits are independently distributed. 
Consider the following sequence of information sources: 
{n^}, i = 1, 2, ... a>. Source partitions the random variable into 
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i equal sized subsets, and predicts with perfect accuracy which subset the 
realization, will be. Figure 2.3 pictures the first four of these sources. 
"1 Vj 
B A B A B A 
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
B 
Figures 2.3. The beginning of a sequence of partitions. 
The first source offers nothing we do not already know, source two tells 
whether the realization will be above or below the mean^ and so on. 
Source n = » is perfect information. The variance of each member of 
partition n^ will be 
v = (B - A)^/12n^. 
°i ^ 
The source predicts the subset. The banker will receive a code 
number y, 1 ^  y ^  n which identifies the subset into which will fall. 
The code number y tells the banker 
(n + 1 - y)A + (y - 1)B < < (n - y)A + yB ^ 
— X — 
< y < n. (2.50) 
For example, if n^ = 4 and y = 3, the message is identifying the cross-
hatched subset in figure2.3. That is, ^ "4 
Upon learning y, the banker will choose the loan rate, as in (2.41) 
t E(ÎLjy) (2.51) 
This is a linear function of the mean of the above interval. The mean is 
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E(ZL^|y) = (2n - 2y + 1)A + (2y - l)B/2n. (2.52) 
Substitution of the optimal decision rule (2.51) back into (2.49) 
give? the maximum of expected profits, conditional upon the message y 
max E 
EL. 
[ir ] = —^ {(4n^ + 4y^ - 8ny + 4n - 4y + 1)A^ 
ly 8n 
+ (4y^ - 4y + 1)B^ 
+ (-8y^ + 8ny + 8y - 4n - 2)AB + n^r^ 
- 2nrg[(2n - 2y + 1)A + (2y - 1)B]} 
+ r^[(l - k)(D . + ËD.) + K ,]. (2.53) 
VJ 1 t,Z 
To get the nonconditional expected maximum payoff when ve have degree 
n precision, we expect over the random variable y. It is a convenient 
property of the uniform distribution that each y has probability 1/n. 
Therefore 
S %|y ''t^ - i (2-54) 
Utilizing the facts 
° y , and I 1 . °(n + l)(2n + 1) 
y=l y=l ° 
we have, for degree n precision, after tedious algebra, 
^ i IA' + AB + - f ^ 
(n^=n) i'-' 
- (A - B)^ + r-Kl - k) 
24n^ ® 
X (D^ 1 +ËBp + g]. (2.55) 
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For the case n = 1 we get 
^SLjy^^t^ = I - I rg(^^) + I 
+ TglCl - k)(Dt 1 + ZD^ + Kt/?]' (2.56) 
Likewise, for n = «> we get 
1 r.2 , 1 ,A + . 1 2 
y 6 + AB + B ] - % g ) + 8 E max 
(n 
1 
+ rg[(l - k)(D^ + ZDL) + ^]. (2.57) 
The difference between (2.57) and (2.56) is, of course, the expected 
value of the perfect information structure 
EVIS = Ey ^ 
1 2 ^ 
= =-jVar(IL^), (2.58) 
which is in line with previous calculations. 
More generally, the value of precision n information over no 
information (n=l) is 
EVIS = 
= Y Var(ZLp[l - l/nf], (2.59) 
which is an increasing function of the precision n. The optimal degree 
of precision can be found by comparing the cost of that precision with 
the above value. 
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The simplicity of the solution makes me wonder if a similar 
distribution-free result could be obtained. This seems doubtful, 
since the conditional distributions are much more difficult to find 
with other distributions. For example, let X be normally distributed. 
What is the distribution of X, conditional on X ^  X? The problem of 
determining the generalized value of icperfect information is a subject 
matter for future research. 
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III. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN DYNAMIC 
ECONOMIC MODELS 
A. Introduction 
Up to this point, this dissertation has been concerned with the 
value of information in essentially static decision problems. In this 
chapter, we shall be concerned with the determinants of the value of 
information in dynamic economic models, that is, ones in which time 
enters in a meaningful way. 
Let us therefore reinterpret the payoff relevant act description c 
and the payoff relevant state description z as time sequences over a 
horizon T, i.e. 
c = {c^}, z = {z^}, t = 1, ..., T. (3.1) 
Each component c^ of c will be called a successive action and each 
component z^ of z will be called a successive event. The sequence z 
itself will be termed the environment, or the state. 
Let the outcome be additively decomposable and representable as 
the sum of discounted successive outcomes, that is, 
^t 
cr(z,c) = ZÔ o(z , c ) (3.2)  
t=l ^ 
where 5 is a discount constant. 
A successive action c^ is taken using the optimal decision rule a*, 
which is a function of the information available at time t. Suppose 
that, at time t, the information available for current decisions is 
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some function of the environment up to time t-d and no further back 
than t-d-y. We will then say the available information structure 
Vd " Vd-l' 'Vd' (3 3) 
has delay d and additional memory y. 
Suppose two structures and differ only with 
respect to length of additional memory, that is, 
\'-d ° (ft-d-; Vd^  
and 
^t-d ° '^t-d-;.- •••' ft-d-w ^-d^-
Then clearly is finer than Y^_^, and by the discussion section E, 
chapter I, , is at least as informative as Y' 
t-d t-d 
Our major concern in this part is with the effects of delay in 
information. Delay is caused by the time it takes to perform the various 
aspects of information processing; observation, collation, computation, 
communication, and explanation. Delay can result in losses due to 
actions being taken on the basis of obsolete data. 
Delay can often be reduced, but usually at higher cost and possibly 
with less accuracy. Clearly, there are tradeoffs between promptness 
in information processing and the accuracy of that processing. The 
remainder of this chapter will investigate the effects of information 
delay and inaccuracy on performance in dynamic decision problems. 
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Control theory is the natural framework within which to carry on 
this investigation. In deterministic control theory, given the planning 
horizon, the problem is to determine the sequence of successive actions 
which will result in the optimization of some given function of the 
realization of the environment, called the criterion function. Since 
the state dynamics are perfectly known, the outcome of each action is 
perfectly known, and it is not difficult (conceptually, at least) to 
determine the optimal sequence of successive actions. But if there is 
a random element in the state dynamics, the outcome of each successive 
action is not perfectly known. If, furthermore, our knowledge about 
the environment consists of delayed measurements, and inaccurate ones 
at that, we have a conceptually much more difficult problem: a problem 
in stochastic control theory. 
Pioneering work in the problem of information inaccuracy was done 
by Kalman [36]. The effects of delay have been analyzed by Marschak 
and Radner [50], Kushner [39], and AstrtJm [6]. ScaaJaiJ references in 
stochastic control theory are Aoki [3], Sage and White [67], and Chow 
[14]. 
The following section illustrates the effect solely of delay with 
a simple scalar outcome function. The final section investigates the 
role of information delay and inaccuracy in the stochastic control 
problem faced by the open market manager of the Federal Reserve, when 
the environment is assumed to obey the standard textbook theory of the 
money supply process. 
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B. The Effects of Delay with a Simple 
Outcome Function 
Let the decision maker be risk neutral with payoff function 
a(Zt,Ct)  = w(z^,c^)  = g^c^z^ -  (3.4)  
We require the successive action c^ be chosen before the successive 
event z^ is realized. Two uses of this type of payoff function in 
economics are: 
1) the monopolist with linear demand curve = z^ - where 
c^ is the price and z^ is the variable intercept term, the 
payoff (profit) function being 
w(z^,c^) = c^z^ - Y^c^^, and 
2) che perfect competitor with a quadratic cost function 
where c^ is quantity produced and z^ is the random price, the 
payoff being 
° - V '=t - v/-
Our interest in this section is solely with the effects of delay 
in the observation of the environment z. When an observation is 
received, it is assumed to be perfectly measured. The problem is to 
determine the expected loss due to the delay, and to find the sufficient 
information structure 
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^t-d ' 'Vd-u* Vd^ 
which is minimal in the sense of having the fewest number of symbols 
in it. We assume ZQ, the initial state, is known, and, without loss of 
generality, choose the origin such that Zg = 0, 
The general method for solving a problem like this is dynamic 
stochastic programming. Starting at time T, backward induction is used 
to find the recursive relationship which results in T optimal decision 
functions. This method will be used in the next section. However, this 
payoff function has a special property: certainty-equivalence holds. 
For the first period decision, the random variable can be replaced by 
its expected value, and the resulting decision will be the same as the 
mathematical expectation of the optimal first period decision in the 
original stochastic control problem. The next period the problem is 
resolved and a new certainty-equivalent decision is made based upon 
any updated information. Thus, instead of having to solve for T 
decision functions, we need only solve for T decisions; there is no need 
to be concerned with values of the random variable which do not in fact 
occur. This property of the quadratic payoff function was first 
realized by Simon [70]. It also goes under the name "separation theorem" 
in the stochastic control literature. 
Therefore, for any time t, 1 ^  t ^  T, we need only find the optimal 
decision for that time, given the current knowledge of the environmevit. 
We shall investigate the expected contribution to payoff from 
the period t decision. Denote by y a typical element of the information 
structure ,. We seek 
t-a 
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U(P ,w) = Ey max E^ [S^Zj.a(y) - Yj.[a(y)] ] 
= Ey max [B^ot(y)E(z^|y) - Y^faCy)]^], (3.5) 
where the final equality follows from the linearity of the E operator. 
Setting the derivative of the quantity in brackets equal to zero gives 
the optimal decision rule 
E(zJy) 
ct*(y) = 2Y • (3.6) 
Substitution of this decision rule back into the payoff function 
(3.5) gives the maximum expected payoff conditional on the information; 
6f[E(z.|y)]2 
max Eg I w(z^,o(y)) = — ^ . (3.7) 
a t'^ ^t 
To evaluate equation (3.7) it is necessary to assume the environment 
z obeys a specific stochastic process. We shall consider the effects of 
delay under three well-known stochastic processes: the first order 
autoregressive process, the first order moving average process, and a 
special first order autoregressive moving average process. 
Consider first the autoregressive process 
z^ = OZ[_i + (3.8) 
where e^, t = 1, ..., T is a sequence of independent, identically 
distributed random variables with zero expectation and constant 
variance, i.e. 
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E(ep = G, Var (e^) = v. t = 1, T. (3.9) 
Successive substitution on (3.8) back to ZQ gives the general 
formula 
t s 
= <î> Zq + lé e^_g. (3.10) 
s=0 
Thus, 
E(z^|zg) = 0, and (3.11) 
t-1 2c 
Var (z^Jzq) = v E (j) . (3.12) 
8=0 
Finally, z^ is related to by 
d s 
=t = * =t-d + : * :t-s' (3.13) 
s=0 
The case d = 0 is the case of a perfect forecast, the case d = t is the 
case of no information. 
Equation (3.13) clearly points up the fact that the conditional 
distribution of z^, given does not depend upon anything which 
happened previous to t-d. In other words, 
- p(=tl=t-d' Vd-r •••' V-
An environment exhibiting this property is said to be Markovian. It 
states that . is a sufficient statistic for y e Y In still 
t-d t-d 
other words, when the environment is Markovian, additional memory of 
length u = 0 is sufficient. Thus, the information structure 
J = {z. ,} is sufficient. 
t-d t-d 
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We are therefore entitled to replace y in equation (3.7) with 
z . Then, from (3.13), 
L—a 
E(Zjly) = E(Zt|Zt_d) -
Thus 
^2.2d 2 
= 4v " • 
get 
Finally, we expect with respect to the information signal ,, and 
t—a 
4Yt 
g^4,^°Var(z^_^|zQ) 
4Yt 
= g (3.15) 
s=0 
where the second equality follows from the fact that for any random 
2 2 
variable X, E(X ) = Var (X) + [E(X)] , and the third equality follows 
from (3.12). 
Since the case of no information is t=d, and ZQ is knrwn, 
equation (3.15) also expresses the value of the information structure 
,, since no information has value 0. We see that the value of t—Q 
information is an increasing function of 4», and increasing function of 
the variance of the error term, v, and a decreasing function of d. 
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the delay. For the special case $ = 1, called Brownian motion, we have 
2 
a value of v[t-d]/4Y^. 
t L. 
Given a certain delay, the larger is < f ) ,  the more valuable the 
information. Roughly speaking, <() measures the amount of information 
about the current environment which can be gleaned from past observations. 
A more precise measure of how current observations depend upon past 
observations is the autocorrelation function of a stochastic process, 
which in this case is 
Cov(z , 2  )  
Ps = V = * , s > 0, Ç < 1. (3.16) 
The larger is <J>, the longer does the autocorrelation function stay 
"up," and the more valuable is information with delay d. 
This also can be illustrated with the first order moving average 
process : 
2% = + "^^t-l' t = 1, ..., T, (3.17) 
where is as defined above. This process is also Markovian, and assuming 
ZQ = 0, for 2 £ t £ T, 
E(ZtlZt_i) = (3.18a) 
and 
E(Ztlzt_g) = 0 for s > 1. (3.18b) 
Again, a sufficient information structure is composed only of the 
most recent observation on z. Furthermore, even this structure may not 
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be minimal, depending on d, as we now show. 
It follows from (3.7) and (3.18) that 
max w(z^,a(2^_^)) = —^— when d = 0, (3.19a) 
4Y^ 
when d = 1, (3.19b) 
= 0 when d > 1. (3.19c) 
Expecting over the information variable gives, using (3.17) , 
Y. , 6?v(1+4.2) 
U(? *- ",") - when d = 0, (3.20a) 
= when d = 1, (3.20b) 
= 0 when d > 1. (3.20c) 
Again, this quantity is an increasing function of the variance, v ,  
and the measure of past dependence, (j>, and a decreasing function of 
delay. That $ is a measure of past dependence is shown by the auto­
correlation function: 
p = —^ for s = 1, (3.21a) 
® l+cj)^  
= 0 for s > 1. (3.21b) 
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In other words, if the observation cannot be made within one period 
back- there Is no n?e.n to it all, and no itiioraation is 
sufficient. 
Finally, consider the following special case of the general first 
order autoregressive moving average process 
This process will be used in the next section. 
Successive substitution on (3.22) gives the following surprising 
result ; 
 ^= *:t-l + "t - *:t-r (3.22) 
(3.23) 
All process error terms through ^ cancel out. 
With delay d, is related to z^ ^  by 
(3.24) 
Consider the following information structure: 
Then it follows from (3.24) that 
E(z^|Y^_^) = when d = 0, (3.25a) 
when d > 0, (3.25b) 
where 
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Denote as usual by y a typical element of Y. It follows from 
t—G 
(3.7) and (3.25) that 
max ~ "4 when d = 0, (3.26a) 
a t '  ^ t  
= when d > 0. (3.26b) 
These expressions can b.^. further simplified; for (3.26a), using (3.23) 
zl = [^\ - + 6%]^^ (3.27) 
and for (3.26b), 
t A  A  I2 r ,2 [0 - 4. = [Zj -
- [*^2^ - (3.28) 
where the first equality follows from (3,24) and the second from 
(3.23). 
Finally, expecting over the information variable, and recalling 
the convention that ZQ = 0, the maximum expected payoff from best use 
of the information structure is 
Y . 
u(P , w) = [()) Eg + v] when d = 0, (3.29a) 
g2 
= ^  When d > 0. (3.29b) 
where Eg "f'^o-l' 
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For d > 0, this payoff is independent of the delay. In other 
T ords, for this process, a perfect forecast of does have value, but 
if this cannot be made, there is no sense in making any observations 
whatsoever aside from the Initial information 
Yq ~ ^0-1^' (^0' ^ o)}' (3.30) 
This conclusion i» also borne out by computation of the autocorrela­
tion function for the process: it is zero throughout, because the 
covariance between z. and z_ , is zero. An accurate observation of 
t t—d 
z^_^ provides no further information about z^ than can already be 
gleaned from YQ. It will be shown in the next section that this conclu­
sion is not altered when the assumption that z^ is known is dropped. 
Let z_ be measured with delay d. It is important that z- , and , 
U U—1—a U—1—u 
be provided as initial start up conditions, otherwise the process error 
term eg_^ cannot be identified. 
The import of this section is that the autocorrelation function of 
a time series can be used to judge the importance of prompt monitoring 
of that series. This helps explain the fact that GNP is measured only 
quarterly while the weather is measured constantly. Last quarter's 
GNP gives a lot of information about this quarter's; last quarter's 
weather provides very limited information about tomorrow's. 
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C. The Role of Information Delay and Inaccuracy in 
the Short Run Control of the Money Stock 
1. Introduction 
Most economists agree that the stock of money is an important 
determinant of macroeconomic performance in the short run. Economists 
also agree that the rate of interest is also an important determinant of 
macroeconomic performance. Since, as was shown for example by Poole [62], 
the monetary authority cannot control both the money stock and the rate 
of interest, economists are in much less agreement as to which variable 
is more important to control. One advantage of the interest rate is 
that it is immediately observable and precisely controllable, something 
which cannot be said for the money stock. 
The purpose of this section is not to enter into this argument, 
but rather to analyze the determinants of the expected loss from the 
optimal stochastic control of the not perfectly observable and not 
precisely controllable stock of money. 
Suppose the open market manager of the Federal Reserve is charged 
with meeting given money supply targets as closely as possible over a 
given horizon. The first data he has available at time t is a daily 
average money supply series based upon weekly condition reports of large 
commercial member banks. This series is published weekly with a lag of 
eight days. Since this series is based upon a very small sample, 
it is quite inaccurate. These figures are then revised and "finalized" 
after about three more weeks. They also can be further finalized at 
a later date. The magnitude of these revisions is not always small; 
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Axilrod and Beck [7] computed the correlation coefficient between the 
first published and current monthly annual rates to be .767 for 1961-
1971. Clearly, the information structure available to the open market 
manager consists of delayed, imperfect information. This is the basis 
for the lack of observability argument, 
The lack of controllability can be explained and estimated within 
the franework of the textbook theory of the money supply process. 
2- The money supply process 
When the monetary authority makes an open market purchase of $1, 
the monetary base and the stock of money increase by that dollar. This 
dollar then will show up in a financial institution, which will hold 
back a certain proportion, (1-6), and spend the rest. This expenditure 
will show up in another bank, a portion held back, the rest spent, 
and so on through the rounds. If the process were as simple as this, 
and if the time length for one round were defined as unity, then the 
change in the money stock over the period t, ~ ^ t ~ ^ t 1 be 
AM^ = AB^ + + ^ ^AB^ ,+ •••» (3.31) 
L L L—X L—/ L"" j 
where AB^ = B^ - B^ ^ is the change in the monetary base over the 
period t. 
Of course, the process is not as simple as this. First of all, the 
proportion (j: will not be constant through the rounds. This proportion 
depends upon legal reserve requirements, which vary not only between 
institutions but also between geographic regions, desired excess reserves 
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of the institutions, and the cash drain (proportion not redeposited) 
of the public. Furthermore, the monetary base itself is not fully 
under control. The open market manager can only alter his portfolio 
of U.S. government securities; other sources and uses of the moneLaxy 
base, e.g., the float, membu^ ba^k borrowings, and the treasury 
deposit must be viewed as exogenous random variables. Open market 
activity in response to these exogenous variables is usually termed 
"defensive" operations, open market activity for the purpose of monetary 
control is termed "offensive" operations. 
For empirical purposes, we shall assume that errors caused by the 
above two problems can be captured by the addition of an error term 
to equation (3.31). Our empirical specification of the money supply 
process is then 
AM^ = ABt + + ... + e^. (3.32) 
The interpretation of ij) is that it is the "average" proportion of an 
Increase in the controllable monetary base which gets respent each 
round. Deviations from this average, and exogenous changes in the base 
will be picked up by the term To the extent that exogenous changes 
in the base are transitory and seasonal in nature, use of seasonally 
adjusted data in the estimation should lessen this problem. 
Two other empirical problems remain. First of all, which definition 
of the stock of money should be used? There are many alternative 
definitions, depending upon which financial Instruments one wishes to 
view as money. Secondly, we defined the time unit as the length of 
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time it takes for one round to take place. But empirically, what is 
this length of time, and is it reasonably constant? Clearly, if a 
round takes a month to occur and we try to estimate the relationship 
with quarterly data, the equation will be misspecified. 
These problems will be solved using the fisherman's method: throw 
out a big enough net and hope something gets caught. We will estimate 
the relationship using the definitions Ml, M2, and M3 at weekly, monthly, 
quarterly, and semi-annual frequencies, and choose the best model. 
This model will then be used for optimal stochastic control in the 
face of delayed, inaccurate me^^surements, and the expected loss from 
this control analyzed. 
In order to judge which regression is the best model, instead of 
estimating 
= AB^ + *AB^_i + ci)^AB^_^ + f^AB^? + ... + e^, (3.32) 
we shall estimate 
AM^ = X[AB^ + 4>AB^_^ + + •••Î + (3.33) 
Now, X = 1 is a necessary condition for (3.32) to be equivalent to 
(3.33). We shall, without any further theoretical justification, define 
a specification using the pair (money stock definition, frequency 
specification) as being a "good" model if the least squares estimator of 
A is unity. A priori, we do not know how many, if any, "good" models 
there will be. There is no guarantee that the average length of a round 
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will be one of the convenient intervals at which measurements are made 
(the length might be 3 1/2 weeki, say). There probably are different 
intervals for the different definitions of money. We would expect Ml 
to have the shortest interval and M3 the longest. Also, we would expect 
(j) to be smallest for Ml and largest for M3 for two reasons: 
1) the average reserve requirements are higher for Ml, and 
2) there will be more of a drain from Ml to other financial assets 
than from M2 and M3, simply because the definitions are 
successively broader. 
In order to estimate (3.33), we use a method due to Dhrymes [17] 
and recommended by Theil [77]. We begin with the usual assumption 
that the error term is a sequence of independent, normally distributed 
random variables with zero mean and variance v. In order to estimate 
(3.33), we must dispose of the infinite number of independent variables. 
We therefore write (3,33) in the form 
s t " s 
AM = X Z <j) AB + X* Z $ 6B + e 
s=0 s=0 ^ 
s t 
=  X  I  + 4 C + (3.34) 
s=0 
00 
where Ç = X Z . (3.35) 
s=0 
Thus, the problem of an infinite number of independent variables is 
solved by introducing an additional unknown parameter Ç. The economic 
interpretation of 5 is that it is the expectation of the pre-sample 
value of AMQ, when this value is thought of as random. 
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There are three parameters to be estimated: ( p ,  X, and Ç using a 
sample of size n. The equation (3.34) is nonlinear in (p. The non-
linearity problem is solved by minimizing the conditional sum of squared 
residuals for a given <j), and running <p over its permissable range, 
0 _< <j> ^ 1. By definition, the least squares estimate $ of # is the <j) 
value which minimizes the conditional residual sum of squares. That 
is, define the matrix X, as the n x 2 matrix whose t*"^ row is 
<P 
t c 
[(f, I é" AB ]. (3.36) 
s=0 
The conditional least squares estimator of [Ç Xj^is (X'X.) 
9 Y <P 
where M is the n-element column vector [AM^]. The conditional 
residual sum of squares is where D. = I - X,(X'"XJ 
<p (p 9 9 (p (p 
In this manner, we obtain the least-squares estimates X, t, and $. 
Finally, the estimator of v is the residual sum of squares for $, 
M'DjM, divided by n-3. Theil shows all these estimators to be consistent. 
9 
This procedure was carried out for the three money stock definitions 
and four frequency specifications over the ten-year period 1969-1978, 
with the exception of M3 at a weekly frequency, which is not available. 
1969 was chosen as the beginning year because that is the first year 
weekly monetary base data is available. 
The money stock data used is the seasonally adjusted series from 
the Board of Governors, published in statistical release H6 and "The 
Federal Reserve Bulletin," as stored in the databanks of Data Resources, 
Inc. The monetary base series used is the one reported by the Federal 
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Reserve Bank of St. Louis, as stored in the DRI databanks. The semi­
annual series were converted as a stock from the quarterly series. 
The results of the procedure are shown in the following 11 tables. 
The <j> for which the sum of squared residuals is minimum is indicated by 
an asterisk. 
We found only one model which is judged to be good: the series M2 
at a monthly frequency for ({> = .86. Here are the further details of 
this regression: 
For $ = ,86, with dependent variable AM2^ = M2. - M2^ ,, 
t t t—1 
Independent Estimated Asymptotic conditional 
variable coefficient standard error (SE) 
Ç .715802 1.002 
X .960840 .03457 
n = 120 observations, monthly 1969:1 to 1978:12, the mean change 
in M2 = 4.104 billion dollars, 
R^ = =3598, Sum of Squared Residuals 334.9, 
v = 2.8624 billion dollars squared. 
We must test the hypothesis X = 1, Theil shows that, conditional 
on <J), the coefficients of g and X are asymptotically normally distributed. 
Therefore, I assume that the quantity 
X - 1 .960840 - 1 .03916 _ , 
^ 10345— - - :Ô3457 = 
can be viewed as approximately t distributed under the hypothesis X = 1. 
The critical value for a two-tailed test being about 1,98 at the 
5 percent significance level, we accept the hypothesis that X = 1. 
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Table 1. Results from regression using Ml at weekly frequency 
i )  
Conditional 
5 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
.10 6.06 .49 193.5 
.20 3.22 .54 190.1 
.30 2.25 .57 186.3 
.40 1.72 .59 182.0 
.50 1.37 .58 177.5 
.60 1.10 .55 172.8 
.70 .87 .47 168.3 
.80 .65 .35 164.0 
.90 .41 .20 160.3 
.95 .28 .10 158.7 
.99 .23 .02 157.5 
*1.00 .21 .003 156.7 
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Table 2. Results from regression using Ml at monthly frequency 
Conditional estimate of Sum of 
<p 
Ç X 
squared 
residuals 
.00 0.0 1.88 105.8 
.10 4.30 1.72 103.5 
.20 2.67 1.57 102.4 
.25 2.32 1.48 102.2 
*.28 2.17 1.43 102.2 
2.09 1.40 102.2 
.40 1.76 1.21 102.6 
.50 1.52 1.02 103.6 
.50 1.32 .82 105.0 
.70 1.12 .62 106.6 
.80 .93 .42 108.3 
.90 .83 .22 110.1 
.95 .91 .12 110.9 
.98 .93 .05 110.3 
1.00 .87 .01 109.3 
^Minimum. 
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Table 3. Results from regression using Ml at quarterly frequency 
<p 
Conditional 
Ç 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
.00 0.0 2.09 55.17 
*.01 154.97 2.06 52.91 
.03 53.25 2.02 53.01 
.05 32.87 1.98 53.13 
.10 17.49 1.88 53.48 
.20 9.61 1.68 54.40 
.30 6.81 1.48 55.62 
.40 5.28 1.27 57.13 
.50 4.27 1.07 58.95 
.60 3.57 .87 01.14 
.70 3.13 .67 63.71 
O
 
00 
2.94 ,46 66.48 
.90 2.89 .25 67.92 
1,00 2.54 .048 66.41 
*Minimum. 
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Table 4. Results from regression using Ml at semi-annual frequency 
9 
Conditional 
Ç 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
0.0 0.0 2.09 60.12 
*.01 217.0 2.06 55.68 
.02 109.7 2.04 55.82 
.05 45.3 1.98 56.28 
.10 23.7 1.88 57.15 
.2 12.88 1,69 59.23 
.3 9.24 1:50 61.72 
A  7.49 1.30 64.57 
.5 6.56 1.10 67.70 
.6 6.12 .90 70.94 
.7 5.95 .70 73.73 
.8 5.83 .50 75.13 
.9 5.53 .30 74.62 
1.0 5.02 .09 73.17 
*Minimum. 
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Table 5. Kesults from regression using M2 at weekly frequency 
(j) 
Conditional 
S 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
.0 0.0 1.26 666.4 
.1 14.76 1.45 637.6 
.2 7.80 1.61 605.6 
.3 5.38 1.74 568.0 
.4 4.07 1.81 525.0 
.5 3.18 1.81 477.4 
.6 2.48 1.71 426.4 
.7 1.88 1.49 374.5 
.8 1.32 1.12 325.9 
.9 .74 .62 286.8 
.95 .39 .33 271.5 
.97 .31 ,21 266.2 
.99 .46 .08 263.9 
*1.00 .57 .01 261.1 
*Minimum. 
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Table 6. Results from regression using M2 at monthly frequency 
* 
Conditional 
€ 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
.0 0.0 5,62 531.5 
.1 -.09 5,24 475.3 
.2 .91 4,79 431,2 
.3 1.26 4,29 398.0 
.4 1.41 3.75 374.4 
.5 1,43 3.17 358,6 
.6 1,32 2,57 348.7 
.7 1,06 1,96 342.3 
.8 .75 1,34 337.0 
.84 ,69 1.09 335.3 
*.86 ,7158 ,9608 334.9 
.88 ,79 ,83 335.1 
.9 ,92 ,71 336.1 
1.0 2,39 ,06 344.7 
^Minimum. 
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Table 7, Results from regression using M2 at quarterly frequency 
<p 
Conditional 
5 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
0.0 0.0 6,49 403.1 
.1 13.56 5,86 399.4 
.2 8,66 5.24 397.8 
.3 6.44 4.62 397.1 
.4 4.91 4.00 396.8 
*.45 4.30 3.69 396.8 
.5 3.80 3,37 396.9 
.6 3.15 2.74 398.0 
.7 3.18 2.11 403.1 
.8 4.11 1.47 417.6 
.9 5.82 
00 
441.0 
1.0 6.92 .18 444.3 
*Minimum^ 
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Table 8. Results from regression using M2 at semi-annual frequency 
Conditional estimate of Sum of 
S X 
squared 
residuals 
0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
.1 11.85 5.92 528.8 
.2 5.94 5.32 527.2 
*.25 4.90 5.02 527.1 
.30 4.37 4.71 527.8 
.4 4.31 4.11 532.1 
.5 5.22 3.49 543.0 
.6 6.86 2.87 563.1 
.7 8.99 2.25 592.6 
.8 11.19 1,62 625,6 
.9 12.90 .99 649.7 
1.0 13,60 .35 653.7 
*Mim" TTiiim. 
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Table 9. Results from regression using M3 at monthly frequency 
'P 
Conditional estimate of Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
0.0 0.0 10.38 1682 
.1 -2.24 9.70 1454 
.2 .45 8.89 1269 
.3 1.40 7.98 1123 
.4 1.84 6.98 1012 
.5 2.00 5,92 931.5 
.6 1.91 4.81 875.7 
.7 1.58 3.67 836.9 
.8 1.08 2.51 806.1 
.33 1.06 1.56 786.3 
*.90 1,27 1.33 784.9 
.92 1.62 1.09 786.9 
1.0 3.93 .12 809.8 
*Minimum. 
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Table 10, Results from regression using M3 at quarterly frequency 
à 
Conditional 
Ç 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
.0 0.0 12.05 1525 
.1 n.a. 10.89 1504 
.2 2.96 9.76 1490 
.3 3.62 8,60 1479 
.4 3.33 7.44 1468 
.5 2.79 6.28 1456 
.6 2.52 5.11 1442 
.68 2.88 4.18 1435 
*.70 3.09 3,94 1435 
.72 3.37 3.71 1436 
.8 5.10 2,76 1453 
.9 8.46 1.56 1501 
1.0 11.25 
CO 
1529 
^Minimum. 
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Table 11. Results from regression using M3 at semi-annual frequency 
Conditional 
g 
estimate of 
X 
Sum of 
squared 
residuals 
0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
.1 -10.79 11.01 2406 
.2 -4.77 9.89 2373 
.3 -2.30 8.77 2341 
.4 .04 7.64 2316 
.48 2.35 6.73 2308 
*.50 3.01 6.51 2308 
.52 3.71 6.28 2309 
.6 6.82 5.37 2326 
.7 11.27 4.21 2374 
.8 15.81 3,05 2440 
.9 19.68 1,89 2502 
1.0 22.06 .732 2536 
^Minimum. 
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In conclusion, we find that the length of one round of the M2 
money supply process is about one month and that each round about 86<? 
of each dollar in new bank deposits will show up next round as being 
available for further monetary expansion. The model which explains 
the dynamics of the M2 definition of the money stock is then 
AM2^ = AB^ + (.86)AB^_^ + (.86)^AB^_2 + ... + e^, (3.37) 
2 
where the variance of the error term, E(e^ ) = v, is estimated to be 
V = 2.8624 billion dollars squared. 
This equation can be put in the more familiar and useful form by 
taking the general equation (3.32) 
AM^ = AB^ + (j)AB^ 1 + ... + (3.32) 
u L. C—-L L—Z u 
iterating it back one period, 
AM^_1 = AB^_^ + (i)AB^_2 + + ... + E^_^, 
multiplying through by <j> 
fAMr-l = + ... + (3.38) 
and subtracting (3.38) from (3.32) 
AM = , + AB^ + - (pe^ . . (3.39) C C—J. Z Z C—1 
Thus, the money supply dynamics can also be expressed as the special 
first order autoregressive moving average stochastic process discussed 
in the previous section, plus the control variable. 
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3. Formulation of the optimal control problem 
Before we consider the optimal control of the money supply process 
= (.86)AM2^ . + AB^ + - (.86)e , 
U U—J. C L t—1 
in the face of delayed and inaccurate measurement of M2 over the horizon 
t = 1, ..., T, several preliminaries must be dealt with. 
To be consistent with the rest of this dissertation, define 
z = AM2. = M2. - M2. - and c^ = AB^ = B^ - B^ . as the payoff relevant 
t t t t-1 t t t t-1 
successive event and action, respectively. 
Write 
\ = *Zt-l + ^ t + =t " *Ct-l (3-40) 
as the process of interest. 
It is convenient to rewrite (3.40) as the following first order 
stochastic matrix difference equation 
=t 4» -(p 0 =t-l 1 1 
=t 
= 0 0 0 
^t-1 
+ 0 1 
_^t-l_ 0 1 0 _^t-2_ 0 0 
(3.41) 
Assume that {e^} is a sequence of independent, normally distributed 
random variables with mean zero and constant variance v. 
Next consider the payoff function for this problem. Suppose the 
open market manager were given a set of money supply targets over the 
time horizon, say z*. Suppose the Fed were willing to pay b each period 
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in order to get the money stock one "distance unit" closer to this 
2 
target. Let the measure of "distance" be (2^ - z*) ; hence, let the 
2 
period t loss function be b(z^ - z*) , where the units of b are chosen 
appropriately. This quadratic payoff function is quite reasonable 
for this problem: too rapid increases in the money stock will result 
in losses due to inflation, too small increases will result in losses 
due to economic contraction. 
Futhermore, suppose a money supply rule is in effect over the 
horizon, that is, let it be decided that the money stock grow at a 
constant rate over the horizon. Let z* be generated as 
z* = (1 + g)z*_^. (3.42) 
This growth can be incorporated into the problem by defining the auxiliary 
variable h^ = (1 + g)h^_^, defining z* = h^, and adding h to the equation 
expressing the dynamics, (3.41). The environmental process is then 
4) -4» 0 0 
=t-l ~r "iH 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
^t-l 
0 1 0 0 
t JL 
®t-2 
+ 
0 0 
m
 
rt
 
_ 
0 0 0 (1+g) 
Vi 
0 0 
or, in matrix notation 
+ rc^ + Fe^. (3.43) 
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The component Fe^ is a random vector with mean E(Fe^) = 0 and covariance 
ECFe^e^'F") = 
V 
0 
0 
V 
V 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
= V. (3.44) 
The criterion at time t becomes 
(Z^ - Z*)"Q(Zt - Z*), 
where 
Z* = 
0 
0 
0 
and Q = 
b 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Finally, by completing the square, this can be rewritten as the 
quadratic form 
where 
z; Q z,^ (3.45) 
^t = 
t-1 
and Q = 
b 
0 
0 
-b 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
—b 
0 
0 
b 
(3.46) 
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Thus, over the horizon t = 1, T, the problem is to determine 
the sequence of successive actions {c^} which will 
min E[ E Z; Q Z.] 
{c^} t=l ^ ^ 
\7ith the payoff relevant successive event being generated as 
(3.47) 
Zt = *Zt-l + + FG; (3.43) 
where Z^ and Q are given by (3.46) and 
$ = 
4» — ^ 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 (1+g) 
, r = , and F = (3.48) 
The information available for making the decision c^ is assumed 
to be an inaccurate measurement of how the money stock changed t-l-d 
periods ago, and all previous observations. The variable d represents 
the delay in measurement. Let the information structure for period t 
decision be 
t—1—d ^^0—d—y' >"0» ••• -yt-l-d' (3.49) 
where 
y t-l-d t-l-d ^t-l-d' (3.50) 
with 
0  =  [ B  0  0  0 ] ,  (3.51) 
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and {Hg} being a sequence of independent, normally distributed random 
measurement errors with E(ti^) « 0, VarCn^) - v, and ECn^Eg) = 0. It 
will subsequently be shown that z^, the change in the money stock. 
automatically keeps track of the others. 
As all random variables involved are distributed normally, the 
information structure Y^_2-d ^  ^ vector of dimension (t+Ti) *1» which 
increases with t, and is distributed multivariate normal. For example, 
the first successive action, c^, is based upon the information structure 
and each successive time period another delayed. Inaccurate measurement 
is received. 
Rather than solve the specific problem defined by (3.43) to (3.51), 
let us generalize the problem to the standard Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian 
stochastic control problem: let be an n x 1 vector, a q x 1 
vector of decision variables, y^ an r x 1 vector of observations, Q 
an n X n matrix, $ an n x n matrix, r an n x q matrix, F an n x n 
matrix, and 6 an r x n matrix. Then the environment is described by 
is the only component of which needs to be measured; the model 
"O-d ^^O-d-u 9 • • • 9 
(3.52) 
with 
^t-l-d ' ^^O-d-y* •*" ^ t-l-d^' 
(3.53) 
a vector isa (t + u) x r dimensional space, being the available 
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information set, vith v being the length of additional memory, and 
^t-l-d ' ®^t-l-d "t-l-d* (3.54) 
Tbe sequences tSg} and {n^} are independent normally distributed random 
variables with zero mean and 
CovjFEg, FCg] = V, 
Cov[Fe , n ] = 0, and 
s s 
Covfrig, rig] = V. 
(3.55) 
(3.56) 
(3.57) 
It is assumed V is nonsingular. The criterion is 
min E[ E Z; Q Z.]. 
{C^} t=l t 
(3.58) 
In the neiit two subsections we will solve the general system (3.52) 
to (3.58) for the sequence of optimal controls, C^, and the minimum value 
of the expected loss when the information received about the state is 
both delayed and inaccurate. Then we will apply the results to the 
particular system (3.43) to (3.51). 
Toward this end, we present without proof five lemmas which will 
be used in the sequel. 
LEMMA 1. Let X* and X be r*xl and rxl vectors. Let the vector 
X*"' 
X _ 
^*X 
be distributed multivariate normal with mean «X* and covariance 
R = 
®X 
. Then the conditional distribution of X given X* is 
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also normally distributed with mean 
E[X|X»] = Mx + R%x. a;! (X* - M^) 
and covariance 
E{[X - E(X1X*)][X - E(X1X*)]-'1X*} 
hi ~ ®X*X* 
Furthermore, the variables X* and X = X - E(x|x*) are independent. 
LEMMA 2. Define X*, X, and X as above. For another random 
vector S, also distributed normally, 
E[S|X, X] = E[S|X] + E[S|X] - E[S]. 
Proofs of these two lemmas can be found beginning on page 219 of AstrGm 
[ 6 ] .  
IjEMMA 3. For any function f of the successive event Z^, 
Proof of this lemma can be found on page 184 of Chow [14], 
LEMMA. 4. For any problem of the form defined by (3.52) through 
(3.58), from any time t to the horizon T, 
T 
min E[ Z Z: Q Z ] 
Ct 
T 
= E{min E[ Z Z" Q Z^|y^ . 
^  ^  S  s  L — u  
138 
where E[.|Y^ is the conditional mean of the quadratic form given 
the available information, and the first E denotes expectation with 
respect to the distribution of This lemma is proved on page 
270 of AstrSm [6]. 
LEMMA. 5. Let X be a normally distributed vector with mean M and 
covariance R. Then the quadratic form X'"QX has expectation 
EfX'QX] = M'QM + trQR, 
where tr denotes the trace operation. A proof can be found on page 
262 of Astrom [6]. 
4. State estimation 
For any problem of the form defined by (3.52) to (3.58), it will 
be shewn that the determination of the optimal sequence of successive 
actions and the calculation of the expected loss from optimal control 
requires calculation of the conditional probability distribution 
p(Zg|Yg ^). This calculation is the subject matter of this subsection. 
As all random variables involved are normally distributed, from 
lemma 1, so is the conditional distribution of given Hence, 
it suffices to determine the mean E[Z IY ,] and the variance 
s' s-d 
Var[Z Iy ,] of this conditional distribution. 
s ' s~d 
By successive substitution, the environment can be expressed 
as the following function of the information delay: 
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Z = Z for d = 0, 
s s 
= $Z , + rc + Fe for d = 1, 
s-_ s s 
= $[$Z - + rc T + Fe J + rc + Fe for d = 2, 
s-2 s-1 s-1 s s 
J d—1 d—1 
= * Z , + Z $™rc + Z Fe , (3.59) 
s-d s-m 
for general d, where it is agreed that = I, the identity matrix. 
We shall use the notation 
• ^sls-d-
Thus, from (3.59), 
EtZsl?s_d] = S|s-d 
d ^ d-1 
= $ z ,| , + z $ rc . (3.60) 
s-d s-d - s-m 
' m=0 
Also, from (3.59), (3.60), and (3.55), 
Var[zjY^.,l = E[Zg -
d-1 
= - Zs_d|s.d][:s_d - :s_d|s_d]'*'' + \ 
' ' m=0 
= e°P + z , (3.61) 
®" m=0 
where the third equality follows from the assumptions that E[e e ] = 0 
s p 
for s # p, and ~ 0 for n ^  1. 
The matrix 
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- Vd|=-d"2s-d - Vd|s-dl' "•«> 
is the covariance matrix of the measurement of where the state was d 
periods ago. 
Thus, from the form of (3.60) and (3.61), the problem now is to 
determine the distribution of where the state was d periods ago, given 
the measurement of where it was d periods ago, and all previous measure­
ments. We will obtain this distribution recursively, that is, given 
,  . 1 - ,  ,  a n d  P  , ,  w e  w i l l  d e t e r m i n e  Z  , ,  ,  a n d  P  I n i t i a l  
s-l-d 1 s-l-cl s-I-d s-d 1 s-d s-d 
start up values must also be provided. 
We start by noting the following property of the information 
structure Y ,: 
s-d 
^t^s-di"'s-di • S[Zs_dl?s_l_d' ^ s-dl- (3-G3) 
It can be shown from lemma 1 that Y , , and 
s-l-d 
?s-d = ^ s-d - G(ys-dl?s-l.d] (3 64) 
and independent. The quantity y^ termed the innovation at time s-d, 
is the difference between the measured output at time s-d and what was 
expected to be observed the previous period. In a sense, it represents 
the new information contained in the measurement. 
It follows from lemma 2 that 
S':s-dl?s_d] = ?s-dl 
- ^ [^s-dlVi-d^ + ^ [^s-dlVd' - :[Zs_d] 
= Zs_d|s_l_d + ®t\-di Vd' -
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It follows from lemma 1 that 
®tVdl ° + Ca,[Zs-d' 
X [y^-d - ®tys-d'^- (3-66) 
Noting that E[yg_^] = 0, substitution of (3.66), (3.64), and the condi­
tional expectations of (3.54) into (3.65) gives 
^^^s-d'^s-d^ " ^s-djs-l-d ^s-d^^s-d " ®^s-dls-l-d^' (3.67) 
where 
Vd ' C°7[Zs_d' ".68) 
The result (3.67) is known as the Kalman filter [36]. The estimate 
of the state is composed of information from two sources; the estimate 
of the state made last period, and the inaccurate observation made this 
period. The weight matrix, is termed the Kalman gain. 
The Kalman gain is discovered by computing the two components of 
(3.68). First 
Cov[Z^_d, = E{[Zg_j - Vdjs-l-d^IVd - G(ys-d)]'} 
^ ~ ^ s-dls-l-d^fO^s-d \-d ~ -^®^s-d '^s-d'^s-l-d^ ^ 
= BftZg-d - Zg_d|g_i_d][G(Zg_d - 2s-d|s-l-d)] 
= Ns_der, (3.69) 
where 
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^s-d ~ ^ s-d[s-l-d^'-^s-d ~ ^s-d|s-l-d^ (3.70) 
the covariance matrix of the one step predictor. The first equality 
follows from the definition of covariance, the second from the fact 
E(y^_^) = 0, (3.64) and (3.54), and the third and fourth from the rules 
of matrix algebra. 
Next, from (3.64), (3.54), (3.70), and (3.57), 
- 2(ys-al7s-l-d)](?s-d -
' K[e(Z^_^ - Zs_a|s_T_d) + " ^s-djs-l-d' "s-d'  
= 0N ,0' -r V. (3.71) 
s—d 
Thus, substitution of (3.69) and (3.71) into (3.68) gives 
Ks-d = fs-d®'! f"s-d®' + (3.72) 
as the Kalman gain. 
Further, we must compute 
^s-d " VarlZg_2|Yg_^] = E{[Z^_^ - g_^][Zg_^ -
" - Zg-dls-l-d ' ^s-d^^s-d ~ ®^s-d|s-l-d^^ 
^ '•^s-d ~ ^ s-d|s-l-d ' ^s-d^^s-d " ®^s-d| s-l-d^ ^ 
= *s-d - Ks_dGGs_d' (3-73) 
where the third equality follows from (3.67), and the fourth from 
multiplying the third out, substituting (3,69), (3.71), and (3.72), 
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and simplifying. 
Finally, we compute as 
^s-d ~ Bf[^s-d " ^s-dls-l-d^t^s-d " ^s-dis-l-d^ ^ 
E{[*(Zs_l_d " ^s-l-dls-l-d^ ^^s-d][*(Zs-l-d ^s-l-di s-l-d^ 
= *Ps_i_d*' + V' (3.74) 
where the second equality follows from using both (3.52), its conditional 
expectation» 
^s-djs-l-d *^^-l-d|s-l-d ^^s-d' (3.75) 
and (3.55). 
This concludes the problem of this section. 
We have found that 
' "s|s-d = s-d + "-«0) 
' ' m=0 
where 
^s-d1s-d ^s-d1s-l-d *s-d^^s-d ~ ®^s-d|s-l-d^' (3.67) 
with initial condition for s = 0 
^O-dlO-d-1 ~ (3.76) 
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The next period's one step predictor is obtained from the process 
dynamics (3.52) as 
^s+l-djs-d " ^^s-djs-d ^^s+l-d' (3.75) 
The variance given the available information is 
d-1 
Var[Z |Y J = + S , (3.61) 
s s-^ s-^ a=o 
where 
Vd = "s-d - ».73) 
K , = M , + V, and (3.74) 
s—d s—1—d 
Vd = ["s-d^'ït^Vd®' + ".72) 
with initial condition for s = 0 
N„ , = V^. (3.77) 
V 
It is important to note that this variance does not depend upon 
any of the observations y , or controls C which will be made over 
s-d s 
the planning horizon. It can be computed beforehand. 
5. Optimal control of the model 
In this section we determine the optimal decision function for 
each time period as a function of the available information and compute 
the expected loss from best use of that information. 
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This problem will be solved using the method of dynamic programming. 
Consider the final period, period T, The decision must be at time 
T-1 on the basis of the available information. Define the quantity 
?T = EfWll Vl-d^' (3.78) 
S 
where, anticipating generalization to the multiperiod case, we have 
put Q = îî_,. Substituting in the model (3.52), 
= min E{ ^^T^ ! Vl-d^ (3-79) 
^T 
and multiplying out 
= min + [2C^r^$Z^_^] 
*^T 
+ [C^r-H^rC^] + (3.80) 
gives the criterion as a function of the last period's successive event 
and this period's successive action. The optimal decision rule minimizes 
with respect to and is the solution to 
dV 
dc^ - + rCrl " ° 
Thus 
" ®T^T-l|T-l-d' (3.81) 
where = -(P-H^D'^r-H^^ (3.82) 
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and is the estimator defined in the previous section, (3.60). 
The minimum expected loss in the final period is obtained by 
substituting into (3.79), writing ~ ^ T-1^^^T-1~^T-ljT-l-d^ 
and using the identity ($ + PG^)= 0: 
VT 4- rG^Z^_^ - rG^(Z^_^ - ZT_i|T_i_d) + 
X I^^T-1 ^^T^T-1 ~ "^T^^T-l ~ S-i|T-l-d^ ^^T-'^T-l-d^ 
= 2{Z2_i($ + rG^)'H^($ + rG^)z^_i 
(^T-l ~ ^ T-l|T-l-d) V ®T^S^^T-1 ~ ^ T-l|T-l-d) 
+ (3.83) 
Next consider the final two periods. Assuming the best successive 
action will be taken in period T, the problem at time T-1 becomes 
Vj.j - mln E{ + \ i Vz-d^ ' <3.84) 
^1-1 
To incorporate from (3.83) to (3.84) we use lemma 3. Thus 
Vt_I = GfZf-lQZT-l + Zf_i(* + + ^ S>Vl 
^T-1 
(^T-l ~ ^T- llT-l-d^ S ^T^S^^T-1 ~ ^ T-llT-l-d^ 
+ £^F'H^Fe^lY^_2_^ } (3.85) 
GtZf-lHr-lZT-l + tT_ll?T_2_d}' (3'**) 
T-1 
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where = Q + ($ + FG^) + TG^) (3.87) 
and 
^X-1 ~ 
(^T-l " ^T-liT-lJ ~ ^ T-llT-l-d^' (3.88) 
with = 0 and = Q. 
The solution to the T-period problem is complete by observing that 
(3.86) has the same form as (3.78), The coefficients and b^ are 
obtained by solving equations (3,87) and (3.88) backward in time to t = 1. 
Note we did not need to apply lemma 3 to the term 
(^'T-l ~ ^T-1 T-l-d^ ^^^T^^T-l ~ ^ T-l|T-l-d^ 
because, by lemma 5 and (3.61), its expectation, 
Gf^^T-l " ^T-llT-l-d' S^'^T^S^^T-l " ^T-ljT-l-d^^ 
J J ^  d-1 
= + I )] (3.89) 
is predetermined and independent of both the successive action taken 
and the information received for this and all other periods. 
The same remark is made for the term That is, by 
lemma 5 and (3.55), 
E{£^F-H^Fe^} = tr H^V. (3.90) 
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The overall minimum value of the loss function is given by, in 
accordance with lemma 4, 
+ rGj)-H^(« + rG^)ZolVd' 
T j j ^ d—1 ^ 
+ I trtG/r-E^rC^CO*?^ , ,$ + Z )] 
t=l t t t u-.-d ^^0 
T 
+ Z triH V]. (3.91) 
t=l ^ 
Finally, the remaining expectation is computed by recalling that 
the conditional distribution of ZQ given YQ_^ is provided by (3.60) 
and (3.61), with s = 0. The overall minimum loss from optimally 
using delayed and inaccurate information is, using lemma 5 again, 
-u(p\w) = = Z6|0_d(» + rG^)-H^(4 + ro^noio.^ 
+ trl($ + rG.)'H,(3. + rG.)($V + Z ] 
^ ^ 1 0-d 
T , _ ^ d—1 ^ 
+ Z trlG-r-H 1 ,4* + Z )] 
^  - I  t u t  t — ± — d  .  t=l m=0 
T 
+ Z tr[HV]. (3.92) 
t=l 
The expected loss function admits the following physical interpreta­
tion. The first two terms represent the expected loss due to the initial 
uncertainty about the state. The third term shows the expected losses 
due to the information delay and inaccuracy. If the observations are 
promptbut inaccurate, set d = 0 and we have only the loss from inaccuracy. 
Likewise, if the observations are perfect but delayed, set P equal to 
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the zero matrix. Since realistically the accuracy attainable is 
probably a function of the delay, one can compute the expected loss 
from alternative feasible combinations of the two and pick the combination 
which minimizes this loss. Finally, the fourth term of (3.92) represents 
the expected loss due to the errors which are driving the system (3.52). 
If the observations were prompt and accurate, this term would represent 
the value of a perfect forecast of the error term each period. 
la the specific problem of the open market manager, a computation 
of (3.92) for the system (3.43) to (3.51) results in there being no 
loss due to the initial uncertainty about the state, the information 
delay, or the inaccuracy of the measurements I There is no need to keep 
track of the money stock at all. Over a T period horizon, the expected 
loss from optimal control is 
Y 
-U(P ^~^,w) = bTv = bT(2.8624), 
This conclusion is extremely hard to swallow. The reason goes 
back to the assumption that the sequence of error terms 
s = 0, 1, ..., T are independently distributed, an assumption made 
when we estimated (3.33): 
AM^ = X[AB^ + (3.33) 
A 
Given X and $ as constants, and all previous changes in the monetary 
base, the randomness of is totally caused by the realization of e^, 
and no past measurements of the money stock change make any difference. 
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5. Extension to the autocorrelated case 
This conclusion would not be made if in fact the sequence 
were autocorrelated; then it would pay to keep track of the money stock, 
because then past error terms affect and a measurement will provide 
information about those past error terms. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
does indicate the possibility of autocorrelation in Lhe error term of the 
fitted equation (3.37). 
Theil [77] presents the method for estimating (3.33) when the errors 
are autocorrelated; it requires a very expensive bivariate computer search. 
Let the error term be generated as 
s '  "Vi + 
where {Ç^} is a sequence of independent normal variates with zero mean 
and constant variance v. The least squares procedure for estimating 
Ç and X is now conditional on both (p and p. Theil shows that the data 
matrix X, is the nx2 matrix whose row is 
9P 
t 1 t-1 
[(f.^~-^((j)-p) AB + (*-o) Z <p^ AB ]. (3.93) 
s=l 
The t^ element of the vector of the dependent variable is now 
AM^ - p AM^ The pair (#,p) for which the sum of squared residuals 
is minimum gives the least squares estimators of the four parameters 
involved. 
The bivariate search is computationally very expensive; the cost of 
undertaking it for all three money stock definitions at four frequencies 
far exceeds the value of the information generated. Therefore, it will 
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only be done for M2 at a monthly frequency- Table 12 presents the result 
of a very coarse search, table 13 presents the results of a fine partition 
of m at $ = .86. We find that the minimum sum of squared residuals 
occurs at p = .44. We cannot be certain that this represents a global 
minimum, but it is certainly very close. 
The computation of (3.92) for this case, and hence the value of 
observations on the money stock, will be reported in the future. 
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Table 12. Results from a coarse bivariate search of * and p for M2 at 
monthly frequency 
p 
.3 .6 .9 
-.9 840.8 842.-5 850.8 
—.6 623.9 617.8 621.8 
-.3 477.0 453.2 450.2 
.0 398.0 348.7 336.1 
.3 377.6 303.3 279.4 
.6 375.5 312.8 279.9 
.9 336.2 340.3 337.1 
Table 13. Results from search for p at ^ » .86 
Conditional estimate of Sum of 
P squared 
C  X residuals 
.20 .498 .956 291.7 
.30 .332 .953 279.6 
.40 .096 .947 273.9 
.42 .036 .946 273.5 
*.44 -.029 .945 273.4 
.46 -.101 .943 273.5 
.50 -.268 .939 274.5 
.60 -.903 .926 281.5 
.70 -2.30 .900 294.6 
.80 -8.16 .838 313.7 
Minimum 
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